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NATIONAL REVIEW

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March 14, 1956

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

How Possible Is Secrecy?

MEDFORD EVANS

The Historical Blackout in the State Department

BRYTON BARRON

Singapore—Center of Fear

JOHN C. CALDWELL

Articles and Reviews by JAMES BURNHAM
HENRY BESTON • JONATHAN MITCHELL • ROBERT PHELPS
RUSSELL KIRK • WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM • FREDA UTLEY



from WASHINGTON straight

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

Now the Fight Starts

Now that the Big Decision is history, to the great and manifest satisfaction of the Palace Guard, the GOP is plagued with lesser problems. At least one of these is formidable. Ike's failure to announce that he would insist on Vice President Richard Nixon as his running mate throws the fight for second place wide open. It will include everything barred by the Marquis of Queensbury. Nixon, long the target of smear campaigns, is already considered on the way out by many observers. His leading rivals for the nomination at the moment are Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey and Governor Hertel of Massachusetts. Neither will participate in or encourage smears or sabotage. The Democrats and Nixon's overload of enemies within the Administration will take care of the hatchet work. But the GOP's biggest worry from now to November is the state of the President's health. The slightest indisposition would produce jitters throughout the Party, and the High Command is already worrying over how the voters will react if Ike's health is less than perfect during the campaign.

"Most Astounding Secret"

The Administration will face a fight for life when the \$4.9 billion Foreign Aid bill reaches the Senate floor. Senator McClellan has exposed the fact that Soviet Russia is receiving strategic materials and critical minerals from the U. S. via NATO countries (Congressional Record, Feb. 23, p. 2771, et seq.). Of the 450 items originally on the embargo list (the Battle Act) 250 were removed in secret concessions to our Allies. Subsequent resale by the latter to the Soviet bloc has saved the Reds years in engineering research and development. It would have been better for the U.S., Senator McClellan said, "to permit shells, guns or guided missiles to be disembargoed... they could use those against us only once . . . "

Round-up

Corral a delegate here and a delegate there—they add up. That's the motto of a new division of the Kefauver campaign organization. Headed by Wiley L. Moore, Geor-

gia oil executive, and Mrs. Maybelle Kennedy, Oklahoma banker and Assistant Treasurer of the U.S. under Truman, the new unit will pursue delegates largely in states that do not have preferential primaries and where the unit rule does not prevail. With a goal of 50 delegates, the Moore-Kennedy program includes the establishment of Kefauver-for-President clubs in the home towns of individuals who usually show up at Democratic conventions wearing delegates' badges by virtue of longevity.

Republicans for Lausche?

Democrats who look with deep gloom on the Stevenson-Harriman-Kefauver alternatives, and some Republicans who see no light on their own horizon, are considering a variant of the Willkie coup of 1940. Prominent Southern Democrats have voiced approval of Ohio's Governor Lausche, and his Republican following may be comparable to that in his own party. Proponents of the plan will test the prospects of "Republicans for Lausche" clubs.

Farm Bill

At this writing, a nose-count in the Senate indicates the high-parity provision of the Farm Bill will pass by two votes. If this occurs, it is believed probable that the President will accept the measure rather than exercise the veto power.

Hunting Season: Still Open

"Vic" Johnson, chief field agent of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, is back in town with an empty bag after a month in Oregon and Washington hunting GOP Senatorial candidates. The search for opponents to Democratic Senators Morse and Magnuson was quite unfruitful. Governor Langlie of Washington may run against Magnuson but has not yet made a decision. An alternative possibility is GOP Congressman Jack Westland of Seattle, a proved vote-getter in the state's Democratic stronghold. Morse should be easier to defeat than Magnuson on the basis of a bipartisan conservative coalition; but since the death of Governor Paul Patterson, no new contender has appeared.

fashion foreword for '56

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
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
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
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The WEEK

The President's announcement that he will run again settled a number of questions which hinged directly on his decision. No other Republican, obviously, can hopefully eye the White House; and the fervor for the nomination on the Democratic ticket is considerably reduced. Most significant, however, is the fact that there will be no reconsideration of Eisenhower's program—no reconsideration, that is, of the kind that would have taken place if representatives of competing wings of the Republican Party had ventilated their differences publicly and turned to an open convention for a decision.

The struggle between the two major factions in the Republican Party must continue, and must manifest itself, somewhere. With the President's announcement, the battlefield becomes the Vice Presidency, and Eisenhower's cordial but noncommittal references to Nixon leave open the question who will get the nomination. It may be, of course, that the President has not swerved from his determination to support Nixon for Vice President; and that therefore his refusal to say so, in so many words, was merely in line with the position that such things are, as a matter of form and fact, up to the Convention to decide. (With reference to himself, Eisenhower had said he would run "if the Convention chooses to nominate me.") Anti-Nixonites can take comfort in the obvious fact that Eisenhower's esteem for Nixon is personal; there is little evidence that Nixon, the legendary conservative and hard anti-Communist, has successfully influenced his boss.

It is difficult to foresee, in any detail, just what it is that the President means when he warns that as the result of his attack he will have to lead an "ordered existence." No barnstorming, he did say specifically. One cannot reasonably object to that in an age when television makes possible far more intimate contact with a Presidential contender than was provided by peripatetic candidates. But the President implied not merely that, in the circumstances, barnstorming would be unhealthy; he seemed to be saying categorically that, for a President—"of all the people"—such activity is indecorous. As to that, and an emerging view of the role of the President, we shall have a good deal to say in the next issue, when we will give

the reasons why the President's decision to run is so grievous a disappointment.

Last October Secretary Benson sold a million bales of low-grade cotton abroad, considerably below the world market price. It wasn't, he said, really dumping; and, once the million bales were disposed of, he would sell no more. But he has now promised Southern Senators to sell all grades of cotton in unlimited amounts, and the government's hoard is now 12 million bales. What defense has Benson left against the demand of the National Grange for wheat dumping? What defense has the Administration against the textile manufacturers' demand for quotas on Japanese imports?

A Labor Department spot check of 39,330 firms engaged in interstate commerce last year revealed that more than half—21,549—had violated provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, under which the minimum wage law was established. The Department promises to extend the scope of its investigations this year, particularly in view of the March increase in the legal minimum hourly wage from 75¢ to \$1.00. The analogue should be clear: a minimum wage applicable to old and young, to Northerner and Southerner, healthy and infirm, is about as enforceable as sobriety.

There doesn't seem to be any doubt about the fact that the forty Negro leaders in Montgomery, Alabama, have conspired to boycott the bus company, and evidently there is a law against that kind of thing in Alabama. It is a bad law, in our opinion; it is difficult, in these days of centralized political power, to make effective protest. In free societies, change should be brought about as the result of social, not legal pressure; and that is the kind of pressure the Alabama Negroes are in the process of exerting.

The recent English experience tends to confirm the position of a number of American legislators who are opposed to deficit spending but favor tax reductions on the grounds that they would result not only in greater economic mobility and increased capital investment, but also, due to the attendant increase in consumer purchasing power, increased government revenues. Last spring, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rab Butler, announcing the fourth income tax cut in a row for Englishmen, estimated a budget surplus of 444 million dollars. Computations now indicate the surplus will be closer to 1,250 million. This is one time we should seriously be tempted to Buy British.

Cross our hearts, it's not a plant: we checked. Rather, it is a spontaneous caricature of "liberal education." It happened at Amherst College, in a letter published

in the *Amherst Student* on February 23, by a sophomore called Alfred C. Krass. Mr. Krass feels that Amherstians are a little too smug in their Liberalism. "I feel," he wrote, "that my liberalism would mean more to me if I saw that it could withstand criticism from competent conservatives like Russell Kirk or Sidney Hook." Poor Mr. Hook! Poor Mr. Kirk! Poor Mr. Krass! Poor Amherst! Poor world! Poor, poor Mr. Hook!



And it came to pass, when Eisenhower held up his hand, the Republicans prevailed: and when he let down his hand, the Democrats prevailed.

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Mr. Dulles Nods

Although we are not ready to join the Time-Life organization in naming Mr. Dulles our greatest Secretary of State, we are to be found, generally speaking, among his admirers. The contrast, marked and consistent, between his qualities and those of his immediate predecessor seems to us altogether in Mr. Dulles' favor.

It is remarkable that what were initially judged to be Mr. Dulles' outstanding political gaffes usually look pretty sound in the long run. His position on "massive retaliation," on "brink of war," and the reference to Goa as a "possession," for example, stand firm under critical howls. That is because in these cases Mr. Dulles' political oafishness has consisted, simply, in his telling the truth.

But after telling the truth before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the Middle East, and sticking to his guns, Mr. Dulles suddenly began to sound like a machine politician in an election year. In our foreign affairs, he asserted, all is for the best in the best of possible worlds. The Geneva summit meeting was a triumph of American diplomacy. The Soviet Union is in terrible shape. Their leaders "have failed, and now they have to revise their whole policy...." Moscow is introducing new "tactics of increased tolerance and less dependence upon violence.... This can . . . set up within Russia powerful liberalizing trends.... Communist military power has now been checked.... The free nations [have grown] more strong, more resolute, and more united."

We cannot believe that Mr. Dulles believes these palpable absurdities. He is unconvincing in this tub-thumping role, for which he is so manifestly unsuited. His clumsy truths stand up to the blows of his opponent. His distortions of the truth are already wilting under the attack that was immediately launched against them. Meanwhile, he promotes public ignorance and illusion.

The unpartisan truth is that in the world struggle we have been losing and we continue to lose. For a decade past we have been defeated in battles and campaigns. We are threatened, if we do not reverse the movement of events, with total defeat in the decade to come. Mr. Dulles is wise and right if he means that, even in the face of this prospect, we must not and need not panic. But he serves us ill when he offers a distorted image of reality as a remedy for fear.

Target One

Too much knowledge, also, can be a dangerous thing. Throughout the world, thousands of experts, both official and non-official, are analyzing every last detail about every word and act of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Many a memorandum, and not a few articles, will be written about the significance of the divergences between Bulganin's and Mikoyan's formulation, the meaning of the election of Zhukov to the Presidium, the reasons for the dropping of four dozen names from the Central Committee, and so on. From these scholastic inquiries, conclusions of interest and even of some importance may ultimately emerge; but let us not be diverted from the main line.

During the entire lengthy course of the 20th Congress there was not a single speech or motion or word of dispute over the goal of Communism. The goal was, is, and will continue to be, a Communist monopoly of power throughout the world. There was not the faintest murmur of disagreement with the principle that

in pursuit of that goal the Communists will employ whatever means and methods they judge most expedient. And there was not a millimeter of deviation from the key teaching doctrine that the one great obstacle on the path to their goal is the United States of America; or from the corollary conclusion that the destruction of the independent power and sovereignty of the U.S. is the chief practical task of world Communism.

In order to act wisely, it is not necessary to know everything. You do not need a treatise on meteorology to tell you to seek protection from a storm. Much about Communism and the Soviet Union is veiled in mystery. But there is no mystery in what they intend to do to us; and there should therefore be no mystery about the fact that, from our point of view, the 20th Congress' talk about peaceful coexistence is merely an invitation to suicide.

Farm Demagoguery

Senator Kefauver's simple-minded look is misleading. At Signourey, Iowa, he kidnapped an Administration proposal for an upper limit on farm parity payments, and made it jump, like a circus dog, through paper hoops. His target was not the Administration, but Stevenson (who had promised 90 per cent payments, but had not discussed an upper limit). Kefauver pooh-poohed the niggardliness of 90 per cent; the farmer deserves 100 per cent, and let's give it to him. But, he added, only the farmer whose gross sales are \$7,000 a year or less. Above the \$7,000 level, Kefauver's payments would grow progressively less. On sales greater than \$50,000 no payments would be made.

Kefauver is being himself. But what excuse can be offered for the Administration which is pressing a flat upper limit of \$60,000 for parity payments? The experienced eye of Senator Ellender spotted its economic grotesqueness. It would mean, said Ellender, that "commercial" farms, released from the parity system, would expand still farther and dominate the free farm market; while the protected small farmer, seduced by the government's parity prices, would find himself producing exclusively for Washington's ever-mounting farm surplus.

But the sin of the Administration is still greater. Efficiency, imagination in the use of new methods, and social usefulness are not necessarily associated with bigness; but not with smallness, either. The business of the government is not to create vested interests (even when the vested interest has the sentimental appeal to the small farmer) but to give every producer an equal opportunity to serve all consumers.

All that Glitters . . .

From the *Daily Worker* we learn that the Detroit convention of the National Lawyers Guild was as much of a success in its small way as the concurrent 20th Congress of the CPUSSR on an international scale. The Guild has been declared a Communist front by Attorney General Brownell, and is currently engaged in trying to have the ruling set aside by the courts. Judge Patrick O'Brien, honorary chairman of the Detroit chapter, told the convention that the only sense in which the Guild is a "front" is in that it is a solid front for the defense and extension of the civil liberties of the American people.

Accordingly, the convention went on record as opposing those laws by which Congress has attempted to safeguard the national security against the Communist conspiracy. Specifically, its resolutions called for the repeal of the McCarran-Walter and Internal Security Acts and attacked "abuses" of the Smith Act.

"The speakers' table at the banquet was a glittering array of legal talent," says the *Daily Worker*, and it proceeds to mention, among others, Judges Nathan Kaufman, Theodore Bohn, William Cody, Thomas C. Murphy and Patrick O'Brien. The main speaker was Walter Reuther's lieutenant, Emil Mazey.

Among those who were not present but sent greetings were Governor Mennen Williams of Michigan and Senator Pat McNamara. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, in Detroit to sell bonds for Israel, got into the show. She attended a cocktail party given for the delegates by the Guild officers, and posed for photographs with President Malcolm Sharp and Executive Secretary Royal W. France.

Last, but perhaps not least in its implications, there was a message of "warm greetings" from Arthur D. Shores, attorney for Miss Autherine Lucy of the University of Alabama.

MacDuffie's Trap

The enigmatic Marshall MacDuffie's (*NATIONAL REVIEW*, February 15) latest project: a big exhibit in Moscow this summer of American agricultural products and farm machinery. In negotiations recently concluded in Moscow, MacDuffie obtained Soviet authorization for his idea, plus a promise of four large buildings and an outdoor area in Gorky Park. In New York, Gottfried Neuburger of International Trade Fairs, Inc. (originator of the idea), called for enthusiastic government support. Mr. Neuburger argued that the fair would give Soviet citizens a look at American agricultural achievements and, possibly, open the door for sales of surplus farm products and equipment to the Soviet Union.

To be sure, at last summer's Atoms for Peace Conference, in Geneva, a similar exhibition of our atomic technology benefited only the Soviets who simply and cheaply copied our newest technological advances. On the other hand, if the U.S. Government vetoes the farm fair, the Soviets will be able to cite this as one more proof of the existence of an American Iron Curtain on free exchange of ideas and information. Mr. MacDuffie, as can plainly be seen, has ably maneuvered the State Department into a bad fix.

The Blanks in Oz

The State Department lifted its ban on travel behind the Iron Curtain last November, and by now an American couple has completed the trip. Given the fact that they are clearly destined to serve as a prototype, it is a happy fact that the couple is named Blank. Mr. and Mrs. Blank, having applied for visas in West Palm Beach, bought travel and hotel coupons in New York, exchanged dollars for rubles in Helsinki, have spent five days in the Soviet Union, have returned home, and now serve as grist for a thousand "color" stories on their journey through the wonderful Land of Oz.

Floridians Flee Moscow's Cold But Laud Treatment as Tourists

—headlined the *New York Times*; and then, by way of elucidation:

Couple, Among First to Visit Soviet Since Lifting of U. S. Embargo, Warm in Praise of Facilities and Service

And, finally, a lead fairly reeking with conviviality:

MOSCOW, Feb 26—With cold feet but warm memories of five days in the Soviet Union, a Florida couple fled Moscow today, two days earlier than planned.

And so on and so on and so on (the Blanks were crazy about the Czar's Winter Palace in Leningrad).

However calloused one becomes in a world which wallows in inhumanity, it remains difficult to get used to the blasé American tourist who flits around a continent-sized concentration camp as though he were visiting the Chicago World's Fair. More than anything else, more even than the United Nations, that man threatens, in due course, to drain the Western opposition to Communism of any moral significance by reducing our differences to the level of a dispute between the Elks and the Rotarians. Someone should rub the Blanks' noses in the coagulated mud of the Lubianka cellar, if that is what it takes to interrupt the reverie that is paralyzing the Western will.

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

Senator Humphrey Objects—Mr. Bozell Replies

Dear Mr. Buckley:

. . . I trust in the interest of fairness you will print the accompanying statement in the next issue of the NATIONAL REVIEW. . .

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

Statement by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey on the Senate floor February 23, 1956:

Mr. President, I am not a regular reader of the new, widely-advertised self-styled "conservative" magazine, the NATIONAL REVIEW. From what I have seen of it, I do not consider it either required or recommended reading.

I have seen enough of it, however, to be aware of its misstatements of facts, particularly when these misstatements concern my own activities. The issue of the NATIONAL REVIEW for February 22, 1956, is a case in point.¹ In it Mr. L. Brent Bozell devotes a paragraph to the subcommittee on government security which conducted hearings last year.

Mr. Bozell's misstatements are the kind that could be easily checked. Hence I can only conclude that they were written with a deliberate intent to deceive. The pertinent paragraph occurs in an article by Mr. Bozell called "National Trends" appearing on page 17:

. . . A subcommittee that looked into the Humphrey Resolution for setting up a special security commission had the first crack, and called as its star witness one Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Rauh obligingly set forth the criteria for a good security program (arguing, generally, that the less security the better the program); whereupon the subcommittee called a spate of lesser personages (discharged government employees) who obligingly proved with tales of their own "persecution," that by Rauh's standards the Administration's program was very bad indeed.

¹ NATIONAL REVIEW has referred to Senator Humphrey on only two other occasions, once to remark his intention to speak out against the gas bill, once to note that he is backing Adlai Stevenson in Minnesota. If Senator Humphrey advises us that he is now *in favor* of the gas bill, and *against* Stevenson, we shall be glad to pass the information along.—Ed.

Mr. President, these statements about the work of the Humphrey Subcommittee are demonstrably false. Mr. Rauh did testify, but he was by no means a "star witness." The "star witnesses" were in fact high-ranking officials of a number of departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and the bulk of the testimony heard by the Subcommittee was from such officials.

Mr. Rauh's complete testimony, including his prepared statement, consumed only 18 pages of the 1,350 pages of the published hearings. A number of witnesses from private life testified at much greater length. For example, the testimony of the representatives of Douglas Aircraft Company consumed 32 pages; the testimony of the representatives of the University of Chicago consumed 21 pages; the testimony of the representative of the Federation of American Scientists consumed 20 pages; the testimony of the representative of the CIO consumed 25 pages; the testimony of the representatives of Engineers and Scientists of America consumed 21 pages; and the testimony of the representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union consumed 22 pages.

In addition, contrary to Mr. Bozell's statement, the Subcommittee did not call a single discharged Government employee and did not receive testimony concerning any cases of "persecution" or abuse or specific abuses of the security program. A scrupulous effort was made at all times to avoid bringing into the hearings any reference to specific loyalty-security cases or any particular situations of alleged abuse.

Mr. President, I am sure that this kind of journalistic distortion will not be countenanced by any of the other members of the Senate or of the subcommittee, to whose attention I am bringing this matter. I think we can expect more honest treatment even from those journalists who disagree with us and even in the columns of the NATIONAL REVIEW. I hope that the

editors of that publication will feel obligated to bring the comments I have just made to the attention of their readership.

Mr. President, I assure the Senate that this statement has been sent to the editor of the NATIONAL REVIEW, and I am looking forward to an appropriate retraction, because the comments in the article are unfair, biased, distorted, and do anything but justice to the diligence of the members of the subcommittee which reported unanimously on the security commission, and the measure was adopted unanimously by the Senate. The hearings were conducted in line with the most friendly, considerate, and objective points of view.

Statement by Mr. Bozell:

To put Senator Humphrey's protest in context, the passage of my column just preceding the one to which he takes exception reads: "[Last spring] . . . the Democratic Senate leadership instructed a squadron of subcommittees [headed, respectively, by Senators Humphrey, Johnston and Henning] to investigate the administration of the security program for evidence of overstrictness."

As to the role in the Humphrey hearings of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.: The characterization of a witness as the "star witness" is, of course, discretionary with the commentator. A witness ordinarily gets into the "star" category in virtue of either a) his personal reputation as compared with that of the other witnesses (Rauh's name was the best known of the lot), or b) his having made the most impressive presentation of the case on whose behalf he was called to testify (the ADA's Rauh excelled his fellow witnesses in setting forth, concisely and comprehensively, the kind of security system the ADA's Humphrey was driving at), or c) his having contributed a specific item of evidence that sensationalized the case on whose behalf he was called to testify (Rauh settled the crucial confrontation-of-accuser issue by revealing that "it is a wide open secret in the city of Washington that the informer in this case [Peter v. Hobby, then before the Supreme Court] is Louis Budenz," thus proving that security officers are only playing games when they insist that the identity of con-

fidential informants be kept confidential). Senator Humphrey's attempt to prove that Rauh was not his star witness by citing the number of pages his testimony measures is, of course, silly—though the present attempt to shed Mr. Rauh is understandable. For much the same reason Mr. Rauh found it necessary, in due course, to shed Paul Hughes.

Senator Humphrey's assertion that his committee "did not call a single discharged government employee" is correct. The responsibility for that phase of the operation was assigned to the Johnston Committee (and, later, the Hennings Committee), and was not shared, as I had mistakenly recollected when I wrote the piece, by the Humphrey Committee. I regret the error, and apologize for it.

The balance of Senator Humphrey's assertion on this point is astounding. The committee, he says, "did not receive testimony concerning any cases of persecution or abuse or specific abuses of the security program." It made a "scrupulous effort . . . at all times to avoid bringing into the hearings any reference to specific loyalty-security cases or any particular situations of alleged abuse." The truth is that person after person stepped forward to air the kind of grievance against the security program that Rauh and Humphrey like to hear, and, for all of Senator Humphrey's "scrupulous effort" to exclude any such references, bolstered their charges with testimony concerning some twenty specific cases of abuse. The tales of persecution of which I wrote thus came to the Humphrey Committee at second hand.

For example, on p. 621 of the Humphrey Hearings (Mr. Joseph Amann, president of the Engineers and Scientists of America, is testifying; Senator Humphrey is presiding):

... Perhaps we should briefly review some specific cases. . . . The case of physicist A was heard by the Appeal Division of the Western Industrial Personnel Security Board of January 21, 1945. . . .

Mr. Amann's account of physicist A's fight to obtain security clearance, together with Senator Humphrey's understanding comments, consumes the succeeding page and a half. Mr. Amann winds up the case:

I would like to conclude this item by saying that since physicist A was

eventually cleared, no harm was done; but in good conscience I cannot. He suffered a heart attack as the result of this experience. . . .

References to specific "victims" of the security program—some detailed, some not, some identifying names, some not—can be found on pp. 412, 413, 425, 429, 433, 443, 483, 484, 485, 618 and 623 of the transcript of the Humphrey Hearings. (One witness, Mr. Leon Sachs, of the Jewish War Veterans, prefaced his references to specific cases by asking the committee members to "picture the toll of agony and suffering, the economic hardship and the mental anguish which these individuals underwent as the result of their terrifying grilling by security officers. . . .")

Senator Humphrey's categorical assurance to his Senate colleagues that the committee over which he presided "did not receive testimony concerning any cases of persecution or abuse. . ." was not made, I am prepared to assume, "with a deliberate intent to deceive"; but it was careless of him.

I do not mean to imply that the description of the tribulations of security victims was the Humphrey Committee's principal device for discrediting the security program, or that the heavy incidence of such tales of torment constitutes the best evidence that the Humphrey inquiry was stacked. The "case" device was central to the Johnston and Hennings attacks, but only incidental to Humphrey's. Senator Humphrey's function was to give a solid base to the operation by furnishing a government forum from which leading spokesmen of the civil liberties cult might sound off about "secret informers," "conformity," etc.

After listening to a description of current security procedures from government officials, Humphrey asked for an evaluation of the program, and

called in lay witnesses to evaluate and make suggestions for improvement. The lay witnesses² were, in order of appearance, Thomas E. Harrell, Dr. George V. LeRoy, and Dr. Walter Bartky, for the University of Chicago; M. Stanley Livingston, for the Federation of American Scientists; Leon Sachs, for the Jewish War Veterans; Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., for the Americans for Democratic Action; McGeorge Bundy, for Harvard; Ernest Angell, for the American Civil Liberties Union; David A. Rose, for the Anti-Defamation League; Thomas E. Harris, for the CIO; Joseph Amann, for the Engineers and Scientists of America; Lincoln W. Lauterstein, for the American Veterans Committee; and James Russell Wiggins, for the Washington Post and Times Herald.

Not one of the above qualified, or sought to qualify, as an expert either on Communist infiltration or on the government security program. Every one of them (except Mr. Harrell, who did not criticize the security program, and Dr. Bartky, who confined himself to sensible criticism of government classification policies) flayed the security program—for overstrictness. As Senator Humphrey had every reason to expect from his witnesses' previously declared positions, their combined testimony added up to perfect copy for Elmer Davis' next book.

On the other hand, not a single lay witness was called who, predictably, would urge a continuation of tight security practices. There was not a word from J. B. Matthews, J. Anthony Panuch, James Burnham, Ralph de Toledano, Willmoore Kendall, Robert Morris, Roy Cohn, or Whittaker Chambers. Nothing from representatives of the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, or the American Bar Association.

Other committee members may have disapproved the one-sided show. The kind of questions he asked Liberal witnesses provides strong evidence that Senator Thurmond did. But on the basis of the committee's written record, the Humphrey hearing was not an inquiry at all; it was a device for securing Senate sponsorship for anti-anti-Communist attacks on the security program.

2. The testimony of Mr. B. F. Fitzsimons must be put in the "description" category: Fitzsimons, security officer of Douglas Aircraft Co., explained industrial security procedures to the committee.



Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Star witness?

How Possible Is Secrecy?

That the secret of the atom bomb was kept from the Germans, who could have won the war with it, proves that secrecy is possible where there is a real will to preserve it. Today it is more important than ever

Suppose Klaus Fuchs had worked for Hitler. After all, Fuchs was a German, and the Germans could have used his information. The Soviets, at that time, could not. To be sure, they wanted all the information they could get, but they were more than satisfied (as was Great Britain) to leave production to America. Before 1945, Moscow did not need the secret data Fuchs sent from Oak Ridge and Los Alamos.

The situation was radically different in Germany. It is one of the majestic ironies of history that the Third Reich and Fascist Italy should have alienated from Continental Europe so many of the scientists who were to play decisive roles in the development of America's atomic bomb. By an added twist, it was in Berlin that Otto Hahn and Friedrich Strassmann identified as barium a product of the neutron bombardment of uranium.

"We developed the atomic bomb," says Robert Oppenheimer in *The Open Mind*, "under the stimulus of the fear that the Germans might be at it."

It was known that 1) Germany was seeking a superweapon; 2) that, despite emigration, Germany had great scientific resources, including a head start in nucleonics by virtue of the Hahn-Strassmann breakthrough in fission work; 3) that Germany had the totalitarian ability to allocate her resources to any given problem; 4) that the pitchblende mines of Joachimsthal (later inherited by the Soviet Union), then at Germany's disposal, were one of the world's major sources of uranium. So it was only prudent to assume that Germany was the front runner.

Germany thought so too. Her own effort being a practical failure, she apparently took it for granted that the English and Americans could not be (though they were) on the verge of epochal success. Why should a German scientist have imagined that de-

velopments would occur outside the Reich which had not occurred within the Reich?

Suppose, however, that a competent scientist such as Fuchs had informed the Germans (as Fuchs did inform the Kremlin) that the Americans, English and Canadians were apparently on the right track and were certainly making an enormous effort. Suppose he had told them the direction of the track and the techniques of the effort. As the agent of an immediate enemy, rather than the agent of a crafty ally (which Fuchs was), he could have performed selected acts of sabotage in this country; and, above all, he might have spurred an advance in the atomic laboratories and plants of Germany.

If Hitler had known as much as Stalin did about the Manhattan Project, Germany might have devoted to the atomic bomb some of the effort that sent the V-2's against Britain. And even in retrospect it is not pleasant to contemplate what Hitler might have done, at about the time of the Battle of the Bulge, with a couple of atomic bombs.

Secret Kept from Nazis

The need for secrecy in nuclear science was originally recognized, according to the Smyth Report, by "a small group of foreign-born physicists." Voluntary censorship of publication was established in 1940, more than two years before the Army's Manhattan District was established or General Groves put in command. "The scientists," said Alexander Sachs (Einstein's friend, and Roosevelt's friend), testifying before the McMahon Committee, "Dr. Szilard, Dr. Wigner, and Dr. Einstein, were all of the same view, that there had to be secrecy against leaks to the enemy."

MEDFORD EVANS

And secrecy there was. We incline to forget that the security system of the atomic bomb project worked perfectly against the enemy it was primarily supposed to work against—Nazi Germany. We incline to forget the essential success of the system because Russia infiltrated it so readily.

"Bear in mind," said Dr. Sachs, an economist whose catalytic activity at the outset of the project is history, "that this world community was already functioning and included Prof. Joliot, married to a daughter of Madame Curie." Frédéric Joliot-Curie is, of course, one of the leading Communists of the world. The extent of his influence is clearly indicated in early editions of the Smyth Report, where we are told that the agreement of the atomic scientists to restrict publication was delayed about a year by Joliot's refusal to cooperate. (In the Eighth Printing, 1948, of the Smyth Report the statement about Joliot is omitted. There is no explanation of the omission. Indeed, the index still refers, under "Joliot, F.", to paragraph 3:2; but, like T. S. Eliot's Macavity, Joliot isn't there.)

Robert Oppenheimer was a dominant figure in our atomic energy program for more than ten years, including the war years. The Atomic Energy Commission's ruling that Oppenheimer is a security risk is still informally, but quite extensively, contested. What is not contested is that during the war years he was intimately and intricately connected with numerous Communists by ties of blood, and by love and money, as well as by an extensive fraternal acquaintance that included friends for whom he willingly risked his own interests. Certainly enough distinguished Americans stepped forward to defend Dr. Oppenheimer when a question was raised concerning him (as they also de-

fended Alger Hiss). It is not surprising that Communists got our atomic information and materials. It would be surprising if they had not.

But Nazis did not receive such information!

It cannot be charged as a failure against the techniques of military security that the Soviet Union riddled and rifled the Manhattan Project; for no wholehearted effort was made to apply the techniques of security against the Soviet Union. The techniques were applied against Nazi Germany. They worked.

Is Secrecy "Impractical"?

There has grown up since 1945 a cult of attacking "the cult of secrecy." Secrecy may be used for surprise, monopoly, or bluff. Its usefulness fluctuates; and occasionally it should be discarded. But to neglect it, or to disparage it in general terms, is foolish.

The atomic bomb is the most famous of all the secrets of World War Two, and our keeping it from Hitler was an enormously successful security operation. (Less important to the outcome of the war, but far from trivial in its course, was the achievement of the Germans in keeping from us the secret of the V-2 rocket.)

Specifications of context, aim and duration are necessary to give practical meaning to the general proposition that you can, or cannot, or should, or should not, keep a secret. "Keeping a secret" is simply denying information. But you always deny information—to someone, at some time, for some purpose. The judgment as to the practicability and desirability of keeping a given secret will always depend on the particular adversary and the particular situation in which you face him. It does not depend on the intrinsic nature of the information. Any information which you have and he has not, which he could get from you more quickly than from any other source if you would only give it to him, is information which you may for some definite interval of time deny him. It makes no difference whether this is the date when you intend to invade his territory, or a formula for bullet-resistant fiber-glass.

It has been alleged that it does make a difference. Certain writers have contended that, while you may keep se-

cret your own decision regarding your own schedule (they call this "programmatic information"), you cannot keep secret a "fact of nature," under which heading they include scientific and technical information. The distinction is theoretically arbitrary and practically misleading. "Programmatic information" also consists of "facts of nature." You are a natural man, and so is your adversary. What you and he intend to do to each other is as much a fact of nature as the ebb and flow of the tides. On the other hand, it is an almost nonsensical cliché that "you can't keep the facts of nature secret." It depends on which facts; when; and from whom. Nature does a pretty good job of keeping her facts secret; that is why we reward with Ph.D.'s and Nobel prizes scientists who discover facts of nature.

Yet there are scientists who have Ph.D.'s, or Nobel prizes, or both, who have lent themselves to the foolish propaganda that secrecy is impractical. The result of such propaganda has been to contribute to the dissolution of information control in the U.S. This has been greatly to the advantage of the Soviet Union, which very much needs the information which our plants and laboratories continually generate. It would be pointless to argue whether Klaus Fuchs or the Atomic Energy Commission's Seventh Annual Report to Congress helped the Soviets more. The point is that the Soviet had both and could use each to illuminate the other.

Independent discovery is tough. That is why scientific and technical methods and results are published. In war you don't publish; and so one side gets to know a lot the other side doesn't know. We never did figure out the V-2's, though they were hurting us every day; and the Germans never did figure out the A-bomb, though they might have won the war with it. The marginal utility of denying certain information to the enemy does not have to be great; it has only to be positive, to justify it. Consider the effect of technical reticence regarding radar during World War Two. Here the combatants were like competitors in automobile manufacture. The secrets concerned only details of the next model; yet they were vital (some say decisive) in the Battle of Britain.

To say that a technique is known in a country is not *ipso facto* to say that

the technique is known by that country. Suppose an operation requires a thousand men. Ten men or a hundred men may know how it should be done; but if they cannot train or procure the training of others, the operation will not be performed in that country. And a normal adjunct to training is some kind of advertising among the population from whom the trainees are to be recruited. Now security is training in reverse, advertising in reverse. You minimize public information even though you do not expect to be able to eliminate it entirely. You do not repeat what has been said. You do not popularize technical features. Your slogans point in another direction. You obscure and you divert.

Secrecy is ordinarily not absolute. To expect that it will be may lead to the fatal assumption that all is lost because something is lost; and thus to throwing out the baby because some of the bathwater has been spilled.

One-Sided Caution

Now consider the attitude of the atomic scientists who kept secret from Germany the use made here of what was learned from Germany. There was never any question of keeping uranium fission secret from the Germans: the Germans discovered it. Nevertheless, scientists of the free world, as Fermi has reported, "set up a voluntary censorship and treated the matter as confidential long before its importance was recognized by the government and secrecy became mandatory." The scientists who did that knew that they had themselves produced uranium fission in various laboratories of Europe and America during a period of about five years (from 1934) without knowing what they were doing—until the two Germans, Hahn and Strassmann, published their results in *Naturwissenschaften* in January 1939.

War secrecy is like stud poker: most of your hand may be revealed, but you should have a hole card; even if the card flips over, turn it back. Your opponent might have had a cigar ash in his eye at that very moment.

In the House of Lords, on May 30, 1945 (weeks before Alamogordo, more than two months before Hiroshima), the Earl of Darnley referred to "the atomic bomb, which was almost ready at the end of the war." (For the Earl

of Darnley the war had ended on VE Day.) He submitted to the Peers the question whether such a weapon "might not only destroy humanity, but also the globe." (This was a long summer before Mr. Norman Cousins announced that modern man is obsolete.) Evidently somebody had told the Earl of Darnley something. And he told the House of Lords. And the *London Times* the next day told the world. But nobody paid any attention. No one told the Japanese government; or if someone did, they did not believe him.

Who knows what the Soviet government believed at that time? Because there was no follow-up to the *London Times'* premature disclosure of the imminent arrival of the atomic bomb, the world was astonished by the American military action of August 6, 1945. Other historically interesting but practically inconsequential breaches of the security silence on atomic energy include a *Time* article of November 27, 1944; an article in *Newsweek* on April 19, 1943 on "Atomic Explosive"; and a London dispatch of June 1945 referring to evidence that the Germans, had they not been defeated, would have used a "uranium bomb" in August 1945.

As Dr. Oppenheimer has said, it is not easy to give away a secret. That is a fact of nature which the security officer finds to his advantage.

Importance of Security Now

A secret can be kept—thousands of secrets can be kept by thousands of people—if there is an all-pervasive desire to keep it. The fact that the Soviets learned as much as they did about the Manhattan Project is not nearly so remarkable as the fact that the Nazis learned so little. The explanation of that most successful security operation is found in the words of Dr. Alexander Sachs: "*The scientists . . . were all of the same view, that there had to be secrecy against leaks to the enemy.*"

Hitler might have won World War Two if it had not been for Allied security. The Soviet Union is likely to win World War Three if we do not now improve security. Security is more important now than ever because of 1) the traditional Soviet reliance on Trojan-horse and other subversive methods; 2) the rapid changes in tech-

nology, which develop new secrets daily; and 3) the dependence of both sides on large organizations, involving elaborate services of communications and supply, which invite sabotage.

The Communist world has a preponderance of organized manpower. The free world has an advantage in modern (largely atomic) firepower. Communist strategy is accordingly to negate our atomic firepower. To this end the Communists are pursuing simultaneously at least four approaches: 1) to manufacture atomic weapons in the Soviet Union; 2) to steal atomic weapons from the U.S.; 3) to outlaw atomic weapons; 4) to prevent the U.S. from using its own weapons either offensively or defensively.

The countermeasures are largely security operations. They are 1) to protect our atomic trade secrets; 2) to protect our manufactured atomic materials; 3) to screen out of our staffs all Hisses, Burgess and Macleans.

The Soviet Union cannot change its hostility toward the U.S. As Dr. Oppenheimer has said, "The ideological underpinning of [Soviet state] power—namely: the belief in the inevitability of conflict between Russia and the capitalist world, or the allegedly capitalist world—this underpinning . . . is most difficult . . . for a government to renounce."

The Soviet Union will therefore try against the U.S. every kind of force and guile that serves. It will not try open force unless its advantage appears overwhelming (as it won't while we maintain open atomic superiority). Through guile, the Soviet will attempt to lead us to renounce atomic weapons either by universal legal convention, or by *ad hoc* administrative decisions on each recurring crisis; and to infiltrate our military and atomic installations in such a way as to permit sabotage of any move we might make toward actual use of the bomb.

The national security of the U.S. depends upon maintaining 1) the legality of atomic weapons and 2) the internal security of the U.S. atomic energy project. This is the vital essence of our situation. And we must not permit an allegedly sophisticated community of scientists to play with the very concept of security—the immense role of secrecy in the nation's effort to survive.

ON THE LEFT

C. B. R.

Khrushchev and U. S. Here is what Khrushchev's latest directive means to the American Communists. The call for "cooperation . . . with sections of the Socialist movement" will result in active Red wooing of Walter Reuther, Americans for Democratic Action, and even Norman Thomas. The theme will be "active struggle against the war danger," "unity of the labor movement," "closer relations with Socialist countries" (meaning Communist China and the Soviet satellites), more Geneva conferences and the promotion of "peaceful coexistence."

Segregation. Not long ago the Soviet Military attaché, Maj. Gen. Aleksandr F. Sizov, rented a \$35,000 home on Woodley Road in Washington, D. C. The deed carried the provision that it shall never "be sold, transferred, leased, rented to nor occupied by any Negro or person of African blood."

Detroit Solon. Senator Pat McNamara, who recently demanded amnesty for Communist prisoners, has introduced a bill calling for the repeal of the section of the Taft-Hartley Act which requires union officials to sign non-Communist affidavits.

Soviet Choice. Arthur Miller's play, *The Crucible*, is to be produced in several cities of the USSR under the title *Salem Witches*.

University of Utah. The *Western Political Quarterly*, published by the University of Utah, recently carried a book review of John Wexley's *The Judgment of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg*, published by Angus Cameron and Albert E. Kahn, of Matusow case fame. The review is by Professor Francis D. Wormuth, who concludes that "the Rosenberg case is our Dreyfus case, outdoing the first in sordidness, cruelty, and terror."

Tourist. Rev. Reuben Youngdahl (brother of Federal Judge Luther W. Youngdahl, who threw out the most important counts in the perjury indictment of Owen Lattimore and reversed the State Department in passport cases involving subversives) has been touring the Soviet Union.

The Liberal Line...

WILLMOORE KENDALL

To: All echelons
From: Content Committee, Liberal Propaganda Machine

Directive No. 4 of 1 October 1955 is hereby rescinded. Operatives may henceforth make reference to the magazine **NATIONAL REVIEW** in current output, when and as such reference will assist us in the accomplishment of one or another of our major sub-missions. **NATIONAL REVIEW** is particularly relevant at this moment to two of these sub-missions. We continue, despite the pressure of the immediate situation, to guard our reputation for balanced and unbiased reporting of the national scene. But **NATIONAL REVIEW** has already achieved a kind of importance, temporary to be sure, on the strength of which it may persuasively damage that reputation. We deem inadvisable, under the circumstances, for purposes of this sub-mission, further boycotting of its name. We do not, of course, concede at any point in our output any kind of importance to **NATIONAL REVIEW**. Above all, we observe the familiar propaganda principle of *never repeating the enemy's theses or arguments*. Its purpose is to trick us into placing our vast technical resources at its disposal. We should, therefore, quote from **NATIONAL REVIEW**, or, preferably, describe its actual contents, when — and only when — by doing so we can drive home a point that we are in any case concerned to establish.

When **NATIONAL REVIEW** was first announced, this committee asked Mr. John Fischer of *Harper's* to keep it under observation, and to make recommendations concerning the propaganda policy we should adopt toward it. Despite his heavy responsibilities in other directions (among them, that of occupying *Harper's* editorial "easy chair"), this committee regarded him as peculiarly qualified for this assignment, which he has executed with his usual thoroughness and courage. In due course he lunched with one of the

editors of **NATIONAL REVIEW**, and listened with courteous patience to his exposition of the magazine's "philosophy" and its "stand" on what it chooses to regard as the "major issues" of the day. And he forced himself through the first "half-dozen" issues, this committee having exempted him from our general rule that operatives, both on and off the job, are not to expose themselves to the enemy's theses and arguments. These, it cannot be repeated too often, are false *ex hypothesi*, and can only engender intellectual confusion in our operatives' minds.

For implicit general guidance with respect to the tone and content of output referring to **NATIONAL REVIEW**, operatives are urged to study carefully Mr. Fischer's "Why is the Conservative Voice So Hoarse" in the March issue of *Harper's*. This article embodies, subject to certain reservations and elaborations set forth below, the line duly authorized by this committee.

1. **Operatives will note** and, as opportunity affords, echo Mr. Fischer's overarching "we-are-bitterly-disappointed-in-**NATIONAL REVIEW**" theme, and will note also his daring and skillful use of our recently neglected "the-conservatives-dominate-the-mass-communications" theme. Our task: we always wanted the kind of magazine **NATIONAL REVIEW** could have been; the nation *needs* a magazine that will express the philosophy of modern American conservatism; but *doggone* it, **NATIONAL REVIEW** isn't it. Also, we make the most of the fact that **NATIONAL REVIEW** has, for the moment anyhow, a small circulation by comparison with our own journals. Concretely, we adopt a patronizing tone: **NATIONAL REVIEW** is an "extremist little magazine"; it addresses itself to a "small congregation of the faithful"; besides the latter, it will interest only "students of political splinter movements."

2. Subject to normal checking of

manuscripts by our Scientific Terms section, we emphasize Mr. Fischer's brilliant and discerning clinical explanation of why the editors of **NATIONAL REVIEW** aren't running that conservative magazine the nation *needs*: They are "making up" for "some kind of frustration in their private lives"; they are "emotional"; they have to "throw themselves frantically into a cause."

3. Operatives in the mass media are reminded that Mr. Fischer is writing for a select target audience, not likely to be offended by his indictment of **NATIONAL REVIEW** as "earnest" — "dreadfully earnest," Mr. Fischer put it. We urge extreme caution in the use of this indictment, for, despite the efforts of our organization through the years, there are large numbers of people who tend to approve of earnestness, even in political discourse, and who might therefore gravitate to any organization or enterprise publicly identified as earnest.

4. Operatives are reminded of our general rule that only upper echelons are authorized to make statements about enemy output that cannot be documented, and that such statements must be so formulated that they are incapable of documentary refutation. Note especially Mr. Fischer's charges: there are "heavy clerical overtones" in **NATIONAL REVIEW**; the magazine wishes to "leap back to 1928"; it is "dedicated to the Conspiracy Theory of politics"; it devotes most of its space to "sermons, rather than factual reporting." All four of these statements are, in the enemy's peculiar sense of the term, "false" (that is, intentionally inaccurate). But since they are statements that we *wish* to be true, and therefore ought to be true whether they are or not, they clearly fall under our White Lies dispensation.

Effective immediately, then, operatives will be guided by Mr. Fischer's line. However: in the unlikely event that a copy of this communication should fall into the hands of the enemy, the directive is automatically suspended and, until a future line is established, all operatives are left on their own. Until more specific instructions are forthcoming, proceed *ad libitum* but always with reference to our central principle: a "conservative" publication is not really conservative unless it is Liberal.

The PRINTED Word

JONATHAN MITCHELL

A Week with the Hartford Courant

The *Hartford Courant* has been published continuously since 1764, longer than any other American paper. Its qualities of security and old-silver-and-lace respectability caused it to quiver to its basement presses at the news of the Twentieth Congress in Moscow. Listen to an editorial (Feb. 26):

A vast change has now been set in motion by the new rulers of Soviet Russia. This change has been published for all the world to see at the recent Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. There the last remnants of Stalinism were swept away with what seemed like breathtaking audacity—so used is the world still to what has been. In place of Stalinism there is now a policy of victory through friendly persuasion. Already the world outside the Iron Curtain has begun to adjust itself to this wholly new set of facts. Those politicians and other leaders around the world who stay with us, attached to policies shaped to fight the cold war, are in increasing trouble before their own people. And we ourselves are hardly yet aware of what has happened. But it has happened.

The test of new-epoch policies, the *Courant* finds, should be Nehru. We can claim anti-colonialism of 1776 as a recommendation; let us show our innocent nature:

We [now] look with suspicion upon the different ways of the new nations, typified and led by Nehru of India. This great leader of Asia's and Africa's hundreds of millions is trying to set the pace for all who would come from hunger and misery and ignorance into the full flower of the twentieth century. But, for all the differences between India and this country, it is a free political democracy. Toward such peoples we will henceforth have to be ourselves. We can no longer rely on semi-feudal dictatorships, whose merit in cold-war days was that they were anti-Communist. We shall have to work with those who are pro-freedom—even the freedom to choose a road somewhat different from ours, as long as it is not communism.

The bad news is at the end. Khrushchev's speech is "virtual renunciation

of war as an instrument of national policy," but we must still keep up our guided missile program and "an endless stream of economic aid around the world." The *Courant*, we may guess, has just bethought itself of the Liberal bureaucracy in Washington, for whom peace has its pitfalls no less than war.

How to Make Friends

In another editorial (Feb. 23) the *Courant* tried out a new interpretation of the Geneva summit conference. At Geneva, we were "muscle-bound and tongue-tied," and are still prisoners of our loutish confusion.

One has a sickening feeling, gradually built up by events over the past year, that this country is still fighting Stalin three years after he is dead. Actually, of course, the threat to our life is now something quite different from what it was in the days of the malevolent Uncle Joe. Even before last July's summit meeting at Geneva it had become apparent that the new masters of the Kremlin were smiling, and that they were winning friends and influencing nations all over Asia and Africa. This was capped by the triumphal tour Mr. Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin made to India and the rest of Southeast Asia late last year.

For all that the real change, to which we have yet to react, came with the Geneva conference. That was when East and West agreed that, despite the death struggle between them, nuclear war meant mutual suicide. Since then the Soviet world has been moving, while we have stood still. There was the successful infiltration of Egypt, and now other lands in the Middle East. Finally there was the twentieth Soviet Party Congress, which still is not over. At it there have been long and doctrinaire speeches. But those speeches reflect something new. This is quiet confidence and evident sincerity, with which Mr. Krushchev and other Communist bosses have assured the world that, nuclear stalemate or no, communism can now win the whole world not only without war, but even without revolutionary violence.

Luckily the *Courant* has a formula for success. We should stop asking annoying questions before we shovel out foreign aid:

This country is a past master of advertising. It knows that to succeed it is not you, but the customer, who must be pleased. But in our policy toward the rest of the world we seem to do directly the opposite. We always attach strings to our aid in arms or goods. We support peoples around the world because they are anti-Communist, rather than because they are pro-freedom. Generally we try the impossible task of making hungry and miserable and backward peoples, who don't know what either freedom or prosperity is because they have never had either, over in our own image. Soviet Russia merely offers them help.

So bright are the dreams in which the *Courant* has wrapped itself that it seems discourteous to disturb them. But for the obsolescent MIG's, unsaleable on international markets, that the kindly Nikita gave Egypt, he received in return long-staple Egyptian cotton, which is saleable, and some unbelievers think he is now selling the cotton for United States dollars. Russia has never yet given "help without strings," and, when the effect of the tranquilizing pills wears off, the *Courant* should tell its readers so.

Come and Get Atoms

In our otherwise ineffectual competition with Russia for the favor of neutrals, the *Courant* (Feb. 24) finds hope in President Eisenhower's offer of a billion dollars worth of uranium 235. It is "a master-stroke of world policy," and "a single brilliant stroke in this new cold war that is fought not with arms and alliances but with economics and ideas."

But America must hurry. "Soviet Russia has given signs of offering to help them [underdeveloped countries] with atomic energy. Fortunately it is the one who gets there first who is likely to make the sale."

The *Courant*'s only doubt is in our making the uranium an ostentatious American gift, instead of channeling it through the United Nations:

Ideally this action would be taken under the atoms-for-peace plan. . . . Nor need this [present] direct action by the United States change anything essential about the ideals of the Eisenhower plan. . . .

Foreign Trends...w.s.

Germany is again the essence of Europe, and the Communists make no mistake about it. Indeed (as NATIONAL REVIEW pointed out last week), the Twentieth Congress of the Bolshevik Party made its policy decisions primarily with Germany in mind. They add up to a scheme of corpse-snatching: once Adenauer is dead and gone, the moment will have come for an ultimate turn in German and European policies; and the Communist strategy until that moment must be the seduction of the seducibles.


The seducibles, in Germany, are of course the Social Democrats and, somewhat less predictably, the "liberal" partner in Adenauer's federal government, the FDP. This rather unprincipled and restless rally of "ideologically" homeless Germans (it is the party of the German President, the excellent Dr. Heuss, as well as the party of some vulgar Neo-Nationalists) has once before tried a *Putsch* against Adenauer. (See *Foreign Trends*, NATIONAL REVIEW of December 21, 1955.) *Der Alte*, on his recovery from a serious illness, then crushed the intrigue — for a short while only, it now turns out. Two months later, the FDP bit again. And this time, it seems, the bite could be deadly.

Ganging up with 76 Social Democrats in the state legislature of Northern Westphalia (perhaps the most important of the German federal states), the 25 FDP deputies overthrew the Prime Minister of Northern Westphalia, the remarkable Dr. Arnold. That the FDP cabal swept a Social Democrat, the innocuous Fritz Steinhoff, into one of Germany's decisive positions of power may be the less significant result of the rebellion. The immediately relevant damage to the Adenauer government, aside from losing the most effective services of Dr. Arnold, is the loss of Northern Westphalia's votes in the *Bundesrat* (Federal Council) where, until recently, Adenauer enjoyed a constitutional majority. Herr Steinhoff will, of course, see to it that Northern Westphalia casts its *Bundesrat* vote against all Adenauer policies. In short, the FDP has now created the most serious pitfall in Adenauer's career.

It is unlikely that the FDP, having deserted the Adenauer camp in Northern Westphalia, will much longer remain a partner in his federal coalition. But when the FDP leaves the federal government, Adenauer will have either to invite the Social Democrats in or to ask for a new popular mandate. Faced with such an alter-

native, he can be expected to choose the course of a principled fighter — namely, to take the issue to the people rather than compromise it in a shabby deal. And the issue is as clear-cut as can be: the FDP wishes to engage Germany in a "dialogue" with the Soviet Union, allegedly to recover Eastern Germany. So do the Social Democrats. Before he dies, Adenauer may want to establish beyond doubt that the German people is less seducible than its Social Democratic "ideologues" and its "liberal" confusionists.

"The Peace Camp Grew in 1955"



The map above, reprinted without permission of *Construction and Peace*, an official organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, was published on January 6, 1956, under the title, "The Peace Camp Grew in 1955." It was accompanied by a legend which seems to supply a more realistic view of the world than Western public opinion is normally treated to.

To the Communists, the world is clearly divided into opponents and friends of the Soviet bloc, some of the friends being called, somewhat cagily, "Neutral and Friendly Countries." And these are the countries so listed: "Austria, Yugoslavia, Finland, India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi-Arabia, Indonesia, Sudan,

Syria." Separately, but still in the general group of "Neutral and Friendly Countries," are listed "Switzerland, Sweden, Yemen, Abyssinia."

It is quite possible that some of these possessively cited countries will be embarrassed, if not anguished, by such an official Communist claim. But Communist editors know perfectly well what they are doing, for they have been told. And more important than the self-evaluation of feeble countries is the part ascribed to them in the hard-boiled Communist scheme. Consequently, the honest enumeration of all these countries as "neutral and friendly" towards the Soviet bloc is a most pertinent bit of news.

Singapore—Center of Fear

The Chinese of Singapore, says the author, live under a Communist terror which the British abet while fighting the Reds in the Malayan jungles

JOHN C. CALDWELL

The further one travels from Communist China, the less understanding there is about Red aims, methods and actual accomplishments there. The Chinese of Hong Kong, living face to face with Red terror since 1949, have no illusions. In Vietnam and Thailand, where the governments are anti-Communist, the large Chinese populations are generally anti-Red. In Saigon and Bangkok there are pro-Nationalist newspapers; the activities of Red terrorists have been kept to a minimum. The Chinese in these nations are not necessarily all pro-Nationalist China, but they have an opportunity to know the truth, and need not live in fear.

In Singapore, on the other hand, and on the islands to the south, the vitally important Chinese overseas populations are nominally pro-Communist. Chinese Red agents have been allowed such free rein that hundreds of thousands of people are paralyzed by fear. Singapore is the center of this fear, which sweeps southward, infecting the Chinese of Indonesia, Sarawak and British North Borneo.

We have always been able to point out that no nation has ever become Communist of its own accord, through democratically conducted elections. But if there were to be an election in Singapore today, it would be overwhelmingly won by the Peoples' Action Party. PAP, as it is called, has complete control of labor, and was able to cause 575 major strikes in 1955, representing a loss of 969,000 man-days of work. PAP is nominally headed by Cambridge-educated Lee Quan You but is actually directed by 22-year-old Lim Chi Song, a Communist member of the Legislative Assembly. Lim's office is a hovel, he dresses and speaks like the common man—and he is in a position to call the tune for a city of over a million people.

To understand the frightful malig-

nancy of this city it is necessary to review some simple statistics. Eighty per cent of the population is Chinese; 50 per cent is under twenty-one years of age. Thus each year brings many young Chinese to voting age. For decades the British Colonial authorities took no interest in the education of the Chinese. If a Chinese boy wanted an education he attended one of the scores of private schools financed and operated by the Chinese community.

Techniques of Red Control

No one knows just when the Communists actually moved into the Chinese schools, but in 1955 the degree of penetration became frighteningly apparent when teen-age school girls began to attack the police, and school administrations threw up their hands as magnificently organized student groups took over. The students tell their teachers what to teach and when there are to be days off for demonstrations. With the help of "students" from twenty-five to thirty years of age, every Chinese school in the city has been infiltrated and most are now completely under Communist discipline.

For the past several years these Red propaganda centers have been spewing out their graduates. Barring a miracle the process will continue during the years immediately ahead. The British have hopes that the situation can be remedied before the elections scheduled for 1957. But if there is to be a change, other phases of the Singapore situation must be better understood by the British and forthrightly attacked.

In addition to controlling labor and the Chinese schools, the Communists have such a complete control of news media in Singapore that the city can be spoon-fed the news the Red bosses decide can be digested. There are

three major Chinese newspapers. Two are pro-Communist and viciously anti-American, and the third is pro-Nationalist. The Communist-controlled papers have circulations of 40,000 and 30,000 respectively while the anti-Communist paper struggles along with a circulation of 7,000. Major business concerns will not advertise in it for fear of retaliation. Murder, kidnapping, beatings have been a part of Communist technique in Singapore for the past five years. Terrorism directed against the rich Chinese businessmen has become so effective that men in no way sympathetic to Communism now pay it lip service, subscribe to and advertise in the pro-Red press, donate huge sums of money to finance the Red guerrillas in the Federated States.

George Lee, Opportunist

The story of George Lee, owner of the *Nan Yang Siang Pao*, largest Chinese newspaper outside China, is typical. With a weekday circulation of 40,000 and a Sunday circulation much larger, this paper has become the main Communist mouthpiece in Southeast Asia. Lee is well educated. In addition to the paper, he owns rubber plantations and has the exclusive distributorship for Frigidaire, Nash cars and Admiral products.

George Lee is probably not a Communist. He is an opportunist who believes the Reds are going to win. His father-in-law is an official in Peiping, a fact which also has something to do with his actions. Lee undoubtedly is helping to finance the Red terrorist activities in the Federated States. In return for cash and the backing his newspaper is giving the Communists, he is assured of protection. He owns several large rubber plantations in an area where the terrorists have been very active. Plantations all around his holdings have been attacked and

burned. But George Lee's properties remain untouched.

The case of George Lee is of particular interest because he is financed largely by American business. A high American diplomatic official told me that the Communists have used Lee's American business connections for some potent propaganda. They claim that even American business firms play ball with them; that even America is afraid to buck the tide. Needless to say, the anti-Communist cause would be helped immeasurably if the American firms now doing business with Lee would cancel their contracts.

The Chinese of Singapore have never been made to feel that they are a part of the colony. Always keeping their connections with the home country, they have been Chinese first and British subjects second. Although they have watched with legitimate interest Red China's growth as a great power, they are basically conservative. Had they been given any incentive to remain loyal to Nationalist China it is probable they would have done so. But loyalty to Free China has been discouraged; with British help, the Reds have controlled the newspapers and magazines and have kept out all information about developments on Formosa.

Recently, a group of anti-Communist Chinese began to organize students in the Chinese high schools. After their experiences of the past year it would seem the British might be willing to encourage such an organization. But after three months of effort, the anti-Red students' group has been unable to get permission to organize officially. It must operate without official sanction, almost as an underground organization.

A few weeks ago anti-Chinese students in a Federation city distributed slogans and posters denouncing coexistence. The police began to arrest them for disturbing the peace.

Such incidents are typical of the British attitude in Singapore. Officially anti-Red, spending millions of dollars to fight the Communists in the Malayan jungles, the British still do everything possible to discourage the development of anti-Communist activities among the Chinese.

As thorough as Communist control is at present, there are signs that Singapore can still be saved, that the people have grave doubts about Red

China. One encouraging fact: two years ago an average of 1,000 Chinese students left Singapore each month to study in Red China. In November and December 1955 the number was only twenty. Two years ago no Chinese would consider going to Formosa for a college education. Scores would now be going were it not for the expense of transportation and the obstacles placed in the student's way by the British.

Hunger for Facts

I had an experience in Singapore which indicates that there is a great hunger for solid facts about the two Chinas. In January, I gave a lecture under the auspices of Donald Moore, a staunchly anti-Communist British publisher. It was the second public lecture ever attempted in the city, the first having been a strictly non-political talk by Sir Edmund Hillary.

I spoke on the achievements of the Nationalist government on Formosa and gave some facts about actual conditions in Red China. The interest was tremendous, and even though the Chinese press ignored me, the news of what I had said spread like wildfire. The next day I was besieged with invitations to speak before other groups. An anti-Communist Chinese called upon me to ask how it might be possible to get some of my books published in Chinese in Singapore. One rather amusing sidelight: when I checked out of the Chinese-owned Cathay Hotel I found that my bill had been reduced 25 per cent in "appreciation" of my remarks.

What is needed in Singapore is aid to those Chinese who are still willing to fight. The pro-Nationalist newspaper, now struggling along without advertising, could be given the financial backing it needs to make its influence felt. Anti-Communist books

could be published locally. Anti-Communist motion pictures could be shown in Singapore and all through the Federated States.

The tragedy is that there is no organization to carry out these measures. An American diplomat told me that the U.S. Information Service and the Voice of America are utterly impotent: that the USIS label is equivalent to the kiss of death. American propaganda has been so generally inept that it now does more harm than good. The British have already so compromised themselves that their efforts are worthless. The only solution lies in the possibility that some foundation might take on the job of financing the anti-Communist organizations and efforts.

What happens in Singapore is important far beyond the city itself. In early January, I visited the Chinese colonies in Sarawak, North Borneo. For two days I traveled by boat along the Rejang River, penetrating far into the jungle at several points. Everywhere I found the Chinese present, as businessmen, rubber planters, pepper farmers. Making up over 25 per cent of the colony's population, the Chinese control its economy.

And everywhere I went, I found George Lee's newspaper being read. Every school, other than those operated by American missionary groups, was completely infiltrated by the Communists. Many of the Sarawak Chinese come from that part of the China Coast where I was born and lived. I met scores of people who had known my family years ago. And everywhere I heard the same story. One Chinese businessman told me, "All the people here know about conditions is what they hear from Singapore. I estimate that seventy per cent of our Chinese are now pro-Chinese Communist, not from conviction, but only because they know nothing about actual conditions."

The cancer of Singapore is a spreading infection, reaching out hundreds of miles into the Chinese communities of Borneo and all of Indonesia. If the city goes Communist it will be difficult to keep the rest of the area from going Communist. Fifteen years ago the Japanese won all of Southeast Asia when they conquered Singapore. And today the whole area may again be lost because the British are just as unprepared as they were in 1941.

... the peoples of Asia who are on our side are losing faith. For they have learned the futility of compromise, they know that man cannot serve God and Mammon too, that it is but a short step from coexistence to collaboration.

JOHN C. CALDWELL
Still the Rice Grows Green

The Historical Blackout in the State Department

A first-hand report by the original compiler of the Yalta Papers

In this article, Mr. Barron has made a point of quoting only from material now in the "public domain," in order to avoid the accusation that he has in any way divulged "classified" material.—THE EDITORS

In October 1955, two State Department historians who had played leading parts in preparing the Yalta and Cairo-Tehran Conference papers for publication were summarily removed from office without a hearing. Dr. Donald M. Dozer was dismissed, and I, after twenty-six years in the Department, was informed that, in lieu of dismissal, I would be placed on leave without pay and permitted to retire on February 1, 1956. In December 1955, Dr. Dozer was ordered reinstated in his job by the Civil Service Commission. He has since been again dismissed and his second appeal is under consideration. The charges against my colleague were of a flimsy nature, and no findings of a specific character were ever brought against me.

Of all the Department historians assigned in 1953 to work on the records of the secret wartime conferences, we were the only two who had been outspoken in pressing for prompt, unexpurgated publication of the documents in question. It is more than coincidence that we were also the only two subject to simultaneous action to get us out of the Department.

The opposite approach was that of a colleague charged with compiling the Potsdam data, who told his superiors he had uncovered some documents "too hot for public eyes" and recommended that those documents be returned to the file. He is still on the job, with the approval and confidence of his chiefs.

When Dr. Dozer took his case to the

public and made grave charges against the Department, Senator Bridges, ranking Republican on the Senate Appropriations Committee, called for a congressional investigation of the incident. "The gravity of this matter," Bridges said, "strikes at the very integrity of the operation of certain functions in one of our most important departments, and, if the charges are true, indicate a deliberate attempt to thwart the will of Congress."

The facts leading up to this incident, briefly, were these. In May 1953 the Senate Appropriations Committee asked the State Department to allocate funds for the publication of important diplomatic records, including the records of the wartime conferences. The State Department agreed and gave the Committee the following schedule: The documents of all twelve World War Two conferences would be compiled by June 30, 1954; publication of the Malta-Yalta, Cairo-Tehran and Potsdam papers would be completed before June 30, 1955; publication of the other, and less important, wartime conference papers would be completed before June 1956.

This schedule obviously has not been met. To this day, only the Yalta papers have been published, and they were not in the "unexpurgated" form demanded by the Senate, as we shall see.

As to the Cairo-Tehran papers, they had not been put into galley by October 1955, according to a letter from Donald Dozer to the *Chicago Tribune* at the time of his original dismissal.

There is also no indication that the Potsdam story will emerge from State Department vaults in the near future. To the contrary, one recent AP story from Washington said one Department press officer's "curbstone opinion" was that it would be a long time

BRYTON BARRON

before the Department put out the Potsdam report. A UP story of December 4, 1955, raising the question whether the Potsdam papers would be published at all, added: "State Department officials said no final decision had been made."

Blunders Concealed

Why has the State Department been so reluctant to publish these hidden volumes of diplomatic information despite constant prodding by Congress and by organized groups of scholars and historians? What objections could it bring forth after President Eisenhower himself told a press conference on April 27, 1955:

"I think that to hold secret any document of the World War, including my own mistakes, except only when they are held there by some past agreement with a foreign nation that has not yet been abrogated, is foolish. Everything ought to be given out that helps the public of the United States to profit from past mistakes and make decisions of the moment; that is current information."

But the hard core of State Department bureaucrats do not see it that way.

All too often security restrictions are retained on diplomatic papers today only to prevent the blunders of certain officials from becoming known. What this means is that thinking Americans, even members of Congress, are dependent upon scraps of information for their interpretation and understanding of what is being done in many areas of our national and international life. And they receive this information only on sufferance of the ruling "elite" in any given government department.

An excellent case in point can be made out of the publication of the

Yalta papers, which I was assigned to compile in 1953 shortly after the Department promised the Senate they would be readied for publication within the Department itself. For one thing, G. Bernard Noble, then as now Chief of the Division of Historical Policy Research, and a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, had reportedly gone on record several years before against publication of the Yalta material. *Newsweek* reports that in a 1950 memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Noble advised against publication on the grounds that it would "embarrass" the officials of the Administration and would lead to demands for publication of the minutes of other conferences.

And yet, in 1954, Robinson McIlvaine, now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs under a Republican Administration, was able to report with a straight face, according to the New Bedford, Massachusetts, *Standard Times*: "I have talked to the so-called Acheson holdovers in charge of the historical division, and I don't find anything nefarious about them. As a matter of fact I doubt we will find anything very exciting in the records, in any event."

Missing Information

Notwithstanding that, one newspaper which carefully followed the publication of the Yalta story has estimated that 50,000 words were deleted from the original compilation. Much information is missing. I, for instance, was repeatedly refused permission to go to the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park to see papers which are housed there, despite the fact that these papers are under the custody of an official of this government, and despite the fact that I had reason to believe that there were papers housed there which were relevant to the Yalta story but which were never included in the compilation. The Department also failed to obtain access to the personal notes taken by Governor Byrnes at Yalta, to the papers of Secretary of State Stettinius and the papers of Ambassador Harriman (Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time), who played a leading role in the negotiation of the agreement which made many concessions to Russia in the Far East.

The question of clearance by officials of the Department of State, by

other agencies of government in the case of matter which lies within their field of responsibility, and the permission of foreign governments to use documents which originate with them, is undoubtedly a thorny one. But there seems little doubt that if the project had been in the hands of officials sympathetic to it, they would have had no difficulty in going directly to the White House and obtaining an order from the President that the necessary papers be promptly cleared for action. As it was, it took Department officials more than two months merely to initiate clearance procedures on certain Pentagon material which I had already been permitted to read.

One new device in the clearance procedure, which the holdover officials from the Acheson-Truman regime thought up, was to have all the material—not merely the British documents, but all of our own secret papers—sent to the British for approval before their release in this country. Such a procedure not only makes for additional delay; it is an inexcusable surrender of national sovereignty and American right in such matters. Documents which originate entirely with American officials should never have to be submitted to some foreign government for

permission to show them to the American Congress and the American people.

When Dr. Dozer, who had shared an office with me during this period, made his public statement, he summed up my position as compiler of the Yalta papers as follows:

"When Mr. Barron submitted his compilation for review to the carry-over officials of the Historical Division in mid-1954 he was subjected to grueling brain-washing sessions as they tried to secure his consent to the deletion of important documents. Sometimes he carried a point only by threatening to appeal over their heads to higher authorities of the Department. As a result of changes and deletions in which he did not concur and of the restrictions on his research, the compilation became, as he pointed out in a memorandum to Assistant Secretary McCordle in December 1954, 'a distorted, incomplete, badly expurgated compilation that tends to shield the previous Administration will mislead the American people, and cannot fail to bring criticism on the Department from competent historians and students of public affairs.' This is the compilation, however, which Mr. McCordle leaked to the *New York Times*."

In view of the comments attributed to me above on the unsatisfactory nature of the Yalta compilation, and considering the fact that I originally had almost complete charge in the collection of the papers, it is a strange commentary on the candor of State Department officials and on the reliability of much that appears in the newspapers, that in March 1955, at the time the papers were leaked to the *New York Times*, the Associated Press, in evident cooperation with Department officials, sent out a story which purported to indicate that officials "who worked on the Yalta project for years" were high in praise of the compilation.

If the representatives of the press had asked me, I would have said flatly that the bureaucrats who control the State Department had failed to produce the conference papers as promised. In the case of Yalta, they cannot deny that certain documents were censored and others suppressed, that files were not made available to me, and that some documents already in the public domain were reprinted

I am very much afraid, Mr. President, that we are slowly and passively accepting the Big Brother concept of government described in the late George Orwell's "1984." You may recall the memory hole device in that book which swallowed up all records inconsistent with the State's official history of the hour. You may recall that Big Brother's absolute control depended on a continuous process of falsifying and rewriting history. How many "memory holes" exist today in the Executive Branch of our government? To what extent is the history of World War II being rewritten and falsified? . . . If, because of suppression of vital documents, the past is recorded by official decree without fear of contradiction, the future is likely to be shaped in the same authoritarian manner.

SENATOR JOHN W. BRICKER
April 21, 1954

while others which might have put the self-anointed "elite" in a bad light were carefully omitted from the compilation.

One noteworthy example of censoring was reported by *Newsweek*. General Bedell Smith (then Under Secretary of State) was said to have written in the margin of one Yalta galley proof, "Delete this. It is not pertinent history." The magazine states that Smith's reference was to a remark made by Roosevelt during the plenary meeting of February 19, in response to a question by Stalin as to whether the President intended to make any concessions to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. The Under Secretary's comment referred to the following, so *Newsweek* says: "The President replied that there was only one concession he thought he might offer and that was to give him [Ibn Saud] the six million Jews in the United States."

Commenting on the failure of the Department to publish the volumes of correspondence as promised, the *Chicago Tribune* declared: "This sorry record, we believe, was contrived deliberately to assist the political cover-up of the diplomatic failures and bungling of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and their chief State Department agents. Since the Democrats recovered control of Congress in the elections of November 1954, there has not been even a pretense that the publication schedule to which the Historical Division committed itself would be met."

Sell-Out at Teheran?

What there is of significance in the Cairo-Teheran volumes, which Dr. Dozer says were not even set in galley by the fall of 1955, cannot yet be revealed because of existing security regulations. But one keen observer, Frank Hanighen, writing in *Human Events*, maintains that the papers in question reveal matters of vital historical importance.

The papers, Hanighen says, reveal that the sell-out to Stalin took place a year before Yalta at the Teheran Conference in December 1943. They prove that Roosevelt double-crossed Secretary of State Hull, who had held Soviet demands in check two months before in Moscow; that he double-crossed Churchill, who feared a Soviet



take-over in Eastern Europe even then; and that he airily gave up Free China in a free-wheeling reversal of previous Allied policy. They will strip away two important New Deal arguments in defense of FDR. One, that at Yalta FDR was a sick man and not responsible for his acts. Two, that Russia was so strong militarily by the time of the Yalta Conference that there was no alternative but to submit to Stalin's demands. But Roosevelt was in good health at Teheran in 1943, which refutes the first argument, and German armies were still deep in Soviet territory at that time, which refutes the second. The conclusion is that Roosevelt at Teheran laid the foundation for our present troubles abroad by his sell-out to Stalin in the Iranian compound. A congressional committee ought to ask to see the files and bring the whole story to light.

In his public protest against attempts by State Department officials to "chew up" the record of the Moscow Conference, Dr. Dozer asked officials: "Are you objecting to the publication of the Moscow Conference records because they show that Stalin there offered sixteen months before Yalta to enter the war against Japan? Or because they disclose the contrast between the firm attitude taken by Secretary Hull vis-à-vis the Russians in contrast to Roosevelt's attitude at Teheran?"

I have limited myself largely in this article to the State Department's his-

torical blackout on the secret wartime conferences in which President Roosevelt participated, because I am most familiar with that story. But I would like to add that the Department has also not kept its promise to publish by June 30, 1955, the official *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes on China for 1942. The 1943-1946 volumes, together with the 1941 volume dealing with Pearl Harbor, were scheduled for publication in fiscal 1956. They have not appeared to date, and few of them may be expected by the agreed deadlines. The only official reference book on our Far Eastern relations which covers World War Two, the Marshall Mission to China in 1946-1947, the fall of China to the Communists, and the diplomatic background of the Korean War, remains the notorious China White Paper issued by Acheson in 1949.

Instead of using funds provided for that purpose to publish scheduled volumes for which there has been a keen demand, it appears that the Department instead published in May 1955 two volumes of earlier (1938) correspondence compiled in the Truman era but not scheduled to be issued until this year.

It is my belief that only a congressional investigation will, as the *Chicago Tribune* said, "get the court historians and hatchetmen out of the government and . . . replace them with men willing to disclose the whole of the record to all eyes." Investigation should be made as soon as possible.

THE WORLD VIEWS THE US

FREDA UTLEY

The British press continues to give evidence that it now counts "victories" in overcoming American restrictions on trading with the enemy as more important than the Cold War against the Soviet Empire in Europe and Asia. Thus the *Spectator* said in its issue of February 10 that at the Eden-Eisenhower conference "a minor victory for the British balance of payments was scored by the promise of a review of embargoes on trade with China."

Similarly, the *Statesman* of India remarked on February 3 that "the American agreement to review trade restrictions on Communist China is a victory for the British team." Our own very "liberal" Richard Rovere, who is the Washington correspondent of the one-time conservative *Spectator*, happily reported that "there is something very reassuring" in the thought that Sir Anthony Eden could "address the American people with banalities similar in spirit and tone and phrasing to those they are accustomed to hearing from their own President." To Americans this phenomenon may be less "reassuring" in view of Rovere's further comment that although "the Administration stuck to its guns on China trade," no one in America is now "much offended by the thought that the matter is now negotiable" — in contrast to a year or two ago when "an important section of the press and important congressional blocs would have been moved to near-hysteria by the knowledge that the Prime Minister and the President were considering a relaxation of restrictions."

The Dutch newspaper *Het Parool* came to Dulles' defense on his *Life* magazine "brink of war" statement in an editorial on February 2 which said that "it is nonsense to accuse him of warmongering . . . Washington naturally sees the responsibility for world peace in a different light than West Europe." Another Dutch newspaper, *Het Vrije Volk*, called attention to an aspect of Eden's visit which has received far more attention in the European than in the American press:

It is Britain's business to involve the United States ever more in the Middle East. . . . Washington can no longer support Israel with one hand at the insistence of influential Jewish voters in its own country and simultaneously hold an excusing hand over oil-rich Saudi Arabia.

The British press has also been ascribing the Anglo-American divergence concerning Middle Eastern policy not simply to differences as to how to treat the menace of Russia's intervention on the side of the Arabs, but to an Anglo-American conflict about oil, and in particular "the trouble caused by Saudi Arabia with the large sums of money coming to her from royalties paid by ARAMCO." The London *Daily Mail* regretted the lack of "reassurance" in the Eden-Eisenhower statement concerning "the oil war between Britain and American interests in the Persian Gulf":

On the larger question of Anglo-American policy in the Middle East, whereas the *Spectator*, together with such liberal papers as the *Manchester Guardian* and *New Statesman*, regret the absence of commitments from Washington to defend Israel's present frontiers, the unreconstructed conservative and distinctively illiberal *Daily Mail* supports the November Guildhall speech by Sir Anthony Eden in which the British Prime Minister proposed to settle the Israel-Arab conflict by implementation of the 1947 United Nations Resolutions which drew the Israel border line far behind the territories she subsequently seized in war. "We can only hope," says the *Daily Mail*, "that the American Presidential election year will not turn the Middle East into the Muddle East."

The London *Times* stated on February 3 that "the great battle in Europe is still the battle for Germany, which cannot be regarded as irreversibly won." And it is precisely in the sphere of German-American relations that the Geneva spirit has produced the greatest havoc. On the one hand the Germans have become apprehensive concerning the peace-at-any-price


advocates who brought Eisenhower to Geneva; on the other hand the reaction of a large number of Germans to the Spirit of Geneva has raised doubts in America concerning the future loyalty of the Federal Republic to the West. Letters I have received from friends in Germany express dismay at the evidence produced at the Summit Conference that the Western alliance, even if and when it is strengthened by a German army, will never use its strength either to liberate Eastern Germany or to stem the advance of Communism anywhere in the world. A German industrialist whose factory in Siegen I helped to save from dismantlement by the British in 1948, and who having fought on the Russian front is uncompromisingly anti-Communist, wrote to me in January in the following words:

The cozy chat of your President with Mr. Bulganin at Geneva has caused so much damage that it cannot be repaired within many years. To me the reasons remain unclear, to gamble away lightheartedly a favorable basic situation. The famous "spirit of Geneva" from which your John Foster Dulles has now drawn off the mask, has given the Russians great advantages, during the last half year, the influence of which will be surely felt in 1956 and 1957.

How is Mr. Nasser to be blamed if he starts to speak with the co-existence friends of the Americans, and why should Mr. Nehru be inclined to disassociate from the Russians when your politicians are intoning coexistence songs with them?

Much of my firm confidence in the youthful America, which does not shy at real facts, has been lost in view of the events at Geneva. We here in Europe sit upon a quaking edifice. The results of the French election should show Americans that the West's firm grip on the European continent is not final. Only a few more mistakes in American foreign policy will cause the whole house of cards to collapse. In my opinion Geneva surpassed Potsdam and Yalta.

Other Germans have written to me ascribing the slow rearmament procedure not only to Geneva but also to our all-too-successful "re-education" of the German people which eradicated "militarism." "The new spirit of our citizens" one of them writes, "is based on motor cars, refrigerators and other material gains," and "denies the values which inspire a nation to fight for the preservation of its existence."



The THIRD WORLD WAR

JAMES BURNHAM

To: The Secretariat
From: Intelligence Section
Subject: Weekly Summary, International (excerpts)

The monitor branch is completing its analysis of world press coverage of the Twentieth Congress. It is clear that our ability to control the content of the bourgeois press has reached such a point that we would suffer little loss if we were to dispense altogether with the Party-owned press, which has in any case been of negligible importance for the past two decades.

We are already in a position to state that the primary objective of the Congress has been obtained.

As transmitted by higher instance to this Section, the problem of the Congress was formulated in the following manner. *By an application of the doctrine of the inevitability of Communist victory: a) to reinforce the concept of the futility of resistance to Communist advance; and b) to popularize formulas for non-Communist collaboration in that advance.*

According to Plan

In our recommendations for solution of the problem, we advised:

1. In relation to a), a simple, "single theme" program for the Congress. All speakers at the Congress to picture the Soviet Union as showing unparalleled power and accomplishment in every field of human endeavor; as destined soon to surpass all the rest of the world, and particularly the United States, in everything; as already irresistible in armament and nuclear capability.

2. In relation to b), selected speakers to revive Popular Front slogans, call for peaceful coexistence, propose increased economic intercourse.

3. In order to attain maximum psychic penetration for the above, a manipulation of the world bourgeois press as the principal communications medium for the Congress.

These recommendations were ac-

cepted, and they were carried out according to plan.

The Communications Chain

In its operational instructions, higher instance lifted the recommendation of simplicity to a new dialectical level. Its conception was to have the entire Congress consist of a single speech, or report. This was delivered by Comrade Khrushchev, and then repeated in sections by all the other speakers. The multiple repetition gave hypnotic depth to the carefully limited number of ideas and slogans. It was an entertaining stroke, with a useful diversionary effect, to make mandatory on all speakers an implied condemnation of Stalinist monolithism, and an enthusiastic tribute to collective leadership.

The "sensationalist" requirements of the bourgeois press determined the formulations and timing. Each day's proceedings were designed to provide subjects for news headlines, editorials and columns: promise of peace; threat of war; astounding statistics; sweeping proposals and equally sweeping refusals; mysteries and intrigues; spies and heroes; reversals of the past and conquests of the future.

The world press was transformed for ten days into the publicity apparatus of the Twentieth Congress of our Soviet Party. *Yomiuri* in Tokyo, *Il Tempo* in Rome, *Le Monde* in Paris, *Frankfurter Zeitung* in Germany, the *Times* in London and New York and New Delhi, and all the others, in news reports, editorials, columns and special articles, told the masses of the entire world precisely what we wanted them to hear.

As a typical sample, we call attention to the February 23 column of the brothers Alsop, especially revealing because they are presented to the American public as sophisticated insiders rather than vulgar journalists. Their first sentence is a summary of the concept which it was the objective of the Congress to transmit: "The So-

viet rulers are now genuinely and absolutely confident of their position." Unaware of the process that has led them to their beliefs, they state in their own name what we wish to communicate to the American public, but could not through the medium of a Communist writer.

"Now, as Khrushchev and his colleagues look about them," they go on with that tone of fatality so well suited to aid us in the task of paralyzing the American will to resist, "they can be pardoned for self-congratulation. Their home political base is wholly secure. They have in China a dependable and increasingly powerful ally . . . There is now solid basis for Khrushchev's boast that 'the majority of the population of our planet' is on his side . . . There is not the slightest doubt that the Soviets are now threatening to surpass us, not only in missiles, but in the whole area of air-atomic power."

We must revise upward our estimate of the American public's readiness to accept absurdities.

Eyes Front

Higher instance's decision to keep the tone of the Congress relentlessly "positive" succeeded in focusing the bourgeois press, also, on the positive. Even our most obvious failures and vulnerabilities went unremarked. All comment was on our mighty goals for the future, none on our immense lacks of the present. No bourgeois columnist wrote on the failure of the virgin land development program; the strategic significance of our lack of roads, trucks, cars and telephones; the proof by our meager electrical energy output that our nuclear achievement cannot be of the same order as the American; the revolts in the camps and the revival of religion; the persisting national aspirations in the subject nations of our West and South; the collapse in housing and meat production; the ideological impasse shown by our inability to write a history of our own country or an analysis of our own economy, and by our current need to scramble yet again the past accounts of our revolution; the meaning of the fact that Mao did not attend the Congress . . .

It is as Marxism has always predicted: the old society dies by suicide, not murder.

From the Academy

RUSSELL KIRK

Is Tradition Anti-Intellectual?

We moderns, the old Schoolman said (whether it was Gerbert of Rheims or Fulbert of Chartres, I never can remember) are dwarfs mounted on the shoulders of giants, able to see so far only because we perch upon the immense bulk of the ancients. Yet, being able to see farther than they, sometimes we dwarfs grow contemptuous of the giants, and give them a kick, or aspire to stand in mid-air; and then down we go to the bottom of the ditch. This is the relation in which the intellectuality of any particular generation stands to Tradition, or the wisdom of our ancestors.

So it is become the fashion, in certain quarters, to talk of how we live in unique times, and must solve all our present problems in their own terms, and ought to consign traditional morality and traditional learning to the rubbish-heap. Mr. David Riesman professes to believe that there are no tradition-directed individuals left among educated men today, and he does not mourn their passing. Mr. Harold C. Hunt, Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in his remarks which I quoted in my last article, comes close to employing "tradition" as a devil-term. But I contend that liberal education is necessarily traditional. With Chesterton, I happen to believe in "the democracy of the dead," the filtered wisdom and decisions of wise men in many generations, which comes down to us as Tradition. And I believe that an educational system severed from tradition is like a tree severed from its roots.

Some very intelligent articles lie buried in the files of the numerous law reviews published by our universities. One of these is "Considerations on the Determination of Good Moral Character," by John R. Starrs, a genuinely educated Michigan lawyer (*University of Detroit Law Journal*, March 1955). Mr. Starrs begins with a dialogue from an interview conducted

by a Character and Fitness Subcommittee of the State Bar of Michigan:

"Committeeman: Why did you rape her?"

Applicant: Well, the opportunity presented itself to me and I took it."

And Mr. Starrs inquires, "Ought a Subcommittee be divided on the problem presented by the case of the confessed rapist? Is it reasonable to say that 'old-fashioned' notions of sexual morality ought to go by the board' and therefore the applicant should be approved? Or is it more sensible to conclude that what the applicant did to the girl he might well do with his client's money or reputation, and therefore the applicant ought to be disapproved?"

Such decisions are closely related to the question of what sort of education a lawyer, or anyone else who enters the academy, needs to have. Is pure intellectuality divorced from tradition and reverence sufficient unto our time? Will it do to cultivate the card-sharper's keenness, and let the contemplative mind go hang? Does formal education have an ethical end, or is it simply the sophist's success-school? I think that we are going to have to answer some of these questions in our generation. If tradition is anti-intellectual, the world may not long tolerate new-model intellectuality. Formerly the assumption was that an educated man should aspire to understand tradition and participate in it; only the booby thought himself superior to inherited precept and custom.

Mr. Starrs goes on to inquire into the nature of virtue. What is a good man? The most nearly adequate answer, he suggests, is that of Horace: *Qui consulta patrum, qui leges iuraque servat*. Mr. Starr's simplified interpretation of this phrase from the *Epistles* is that "a good man is a law-abiding traditionalist." Not all good men are law-abiding traditionalists, Mr. Starrs remarks; but it is scarcely conceivable that a law-abiding traditionalist

should not be a good man. Our law schools, and our liberal-arts colleges, in the past turned out graduates who, whatever their deficiencies, were in some measure law-abiding traditionalists. All this is changing, it seems; yet I doubt whether we have succeeded in inventing any new morality to usher in our Brave New World, or in devising some new program of studies to improve upon the literary and historical disciplines which used to be the mark of an educated American.

In education, as in many other things, we often find it prudent to row toward our destination with muffled oars. We did not make our educated men law-abiding traditionalists by giving them three terms of Survey of Law - Abiding Traditionalism; we achieved our end by indirection, rather. The study of great literature, of ancient and modern history, and of scientific theory are in themselves conservative and traditional disciplines. When theological and ethical studies had a high place in the curriculum, an aspirant to the bar may have worked his will upon a girl, now and then; but he did not endeavor to justify his action by the reasoning of dime-store pragmatism. The most bigoted anti-intellectual, I venture to suggest, may be the most new-fangled enemy of tradition.

Any society depends for the mere mechanics of its functioning, if for nothing more, upon the maintenance of a certain level of integrity among the men and women who make decisions. Justice cannot be administered if the lawyer is ignorant of all moral principle, or if he is close to illiteracy, as Dean Warren of Columbia Law School suggests a great many law-students are. If the ethical function of the higher learning is ignored, the very framework of that educational structure soon will be imperiled. And any society depends for the mere foundation and scaffolding of its intellectual life, if for nothing more, upon the accumulated wisdom of the race which we call Tradition. It may tickle an educationist's vanity to pose as an omniscient reformer of politics, morals and philosophy, administering a swift kick to the stodgy old giant under his feet. But I should not like to stand beside the reformer if the giant shrugs his shoulders; nor should I like to be strolling in the ditch if the giant, startled, takes a tumble.

ARTS and MANNERS

WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

Common Man Meets Girl

The common man, a fat slob, is muscling in on the stage. As if it were not bad enough that the common man constitutes the theater audience (which, God knows, is becoming unbearably idiotic), that repulsive creature is now, increasingly often, the play itself—for instance in *Middle of the Night*, which its author, Mr. Paddy Chayefsky, had the effrontery to call *A Love Story*. When it comes to love, I take no nonsense; and when a third-rate TV writer like Mr. Chayefsky has the gall to label three acts of verbal dishwater “a love story,” I see red. On the other hand, I am more bullish on love than ever before: a sentiment that can survive *Middle of the Night* is here to stay.

And so, I am afraid, is *Middle of the Night*. The audience that engulfed me at the ANTA Theater was in a simply orgiastic state. In fact, I must reluctantly conclude that the sickening play is apparently a slice of life—as lived in the Bronx and the surrounding suburbs of hell. The men and women in the audience shrieked with delight whenever a reference to the climactic was made on the stage (and—such is the play—there were several); felt constantly reminded of everybody’s Uncle Arthur; barked bellyLaughs at the vaguest allusion to sex; and, on the whole, qualified for extinction. Indeed, I must request the reader’s patience for another paragraph or two on the audience.

Though the plays are assuredly poison, it is primarily the audiences that doom Broadway. I have seen audiences misbehave in all parts of the world, but the New York theater audience is most certainly the lowest. I do not know all the reasons, though I can suggest a few. In the first place, a Broadway show depends these days on “theater parties,” a truly devilish invention of slick producers. A “theater party,” it seems, is a combination canasta and bowling affair at which the gay matrons and blades of an entire block congregate to exchange social amenities. More often than not, a

Broadway audience consists of only two or three such “theater parties” from the Bronx and East Orange, and the coagulated ordinariness is so terrifying (and so loud to boot) that Shakespeare himself would hide his head in wounded sorrow and die. In front of this overfed ugliness, this boisterous intimacy with the best eating places in town and with one another, language must wither and beauty must shrink.

Common Man Meets Himself

Secondly, these audiences are absolutely enamored with themselves. A sheen of benign satisfaction radiates from their faces; everything that reminds them of something they already know is *eo ipso* smart; and anything that reminds them of themselves is downright terrific. Here, indeed, is the common man in his whole despicable glory—delighted with himself, determined to insist on the egalitarian mediocrity of existence, celebrating his vegetative worthlessness. Indeed, a slob. But in a Broadway theater, the common slob is not only in a choking majority—he is organized. Everybody seems to know everybody (a theater party, no doubt), and you will dislike the play only at your own peril.

The point is that I disliked *Middle of the Night* more than anything I’ve seen this season; but I wouldn’t have dared say it on the premises, which were shaken by the delight, the laughter and the applause of an appalling audience. The point is that Mr. Joshua Logan, who produced and directed the play, ought to turn in his credentials as certified theater talent; but, alas, he’ll make another fortune on *Middle of the Night*. The point is that Mr. Paddy Chayefsky, judged by this play, should at best land a job as “social director” in one of those unspeakable New Yorkese summer camps; but he has already been promoted by the childish critics of the metropolitan press to the forefront of the English drama.

Optimists may contend that the play is such a success only because Mr.

Edward G. Robinson, a veritable Hollywood star, is making in it his return to Broadway. In this I cannot concur. *Middle of the Night*, I’m afraid, would be a hit even if staged and played by unknowns. For it is, as a piece of writing, an altogether shameless flattery of the common and worthless man.

It is all about the urgent question whether The Manufacturer, fifty-three, should marry The Girl, twenty-four. As this is apparently considered a question on which one has to stand up and be counted, I want to state unequivocally that I don’t give a damn either way. What I do care about is the quality of human experience and the quality of language presented on the stage. Both are abominable in Mr. Chayefsky’s case. Yet the shame is that Mr. Chayefsky not only knows this but makes such observed facts a source of most profitable fame.

Common Man Meets Success

Ever since he wrote *Marty*, a TV play that went on and on as a prize-crowned film, Mr. Chayefsky has minted money as the protagonist of what is called the TV school of realism. As far as I can gather, this school contends that slobs can hardly speak; and, if they do, speak stupidly. This I am willing to grant. But I doubt whether this makes for good plays. In less progressive ages, when the Chayevskys and Atkinsons were safely employed as floor-walkers in medium-sized department stores, plays were written on the assumption that only the extraordinary man justifies the play, and only the extraordinary writer justifies its success. In those ages, the only place in the theater for the common man was in the balcony; and only those singular common men took advantage of it who greatly wanted to get out of their rut.

The times have changed and *Middle of the Night* has become a hit. And it has become a hit because what happens on the stage is exactly—but exactly!—“just like when Uncle Arthur took a shine to that young broad.” (Which, on my word, is what I heard in the intermission.) The idea, it seems, is that a documentary is a piece of art because it is a documentary. One cannot even argue with that. One can only take to the hills, where no flower is common and no chipmunk cast in a documentary.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

A Metaphysical Problem

JAMES BURNHAM

A third of the text of ex-President Truman's *Memoirs* (Vol. 2: *Years of Trial and Hope*, Doubleday, \$5.00) consists of official documents, speeches, memoranda and letters. The remainder, in which a flat syntax links one cliché to the next, lacks every literary quality. Nevertheless, if we stick through the 1200 pages of the two volumes, we become in some degree acquainted with the author, or perhaps rather foreman, of this work.

At some point on our journey, we sight the fact that Harry Truman is a man without depth. He is not a villain just as surely as he is not a hero. Bounded by opinion in place of virtue, he is neither good nor bad, as incapable of treason as of sanctity. He has a number of practiced skills, but no mark of genius or talent. He is without shadow, without style.

Now it is a strange thing to have arrived at a time when one who holds the greatest office in the world can be a man without depth. Depth in a human being takes many variant forms; and one or another of these forms nearly every President has exhibited. In Washington it was moral—the dimension of character. In Jefferson it was devious and wide-ranging intellect. In Andrew Jackson it was a resolute popular dynamism that was almost in itself a myth; and in Franklin Roosevelt it was a brazen, wonderful *flair*. In Lincoln a felt background of darkness set off an intricate simplicity; and the dull McKinley prayed in agony as the nation slipped into the Spanish-American War. Even Eisenhower, though in so much like a public relations invention, is touched by charisma, by a magic that issues from a deep spring.

But Harry Truman has neither swift intelligence nor large knowledge nor moral profundity nor folk magic. He is, in the French phrasing, "not serious." In his book, which is very long, there is not one distinguished sentence. There is not a phrase to lift, or dismay, the heart; no new insight or fresh feeling; no surprise; no beauty and no passion and no wisdom.

As we read we suddenly see that Mr. Truman's well-known "ability to decide" is the resultant of his inability to think. He decided issues simply and quickly because he didn't understand

them and did not know how to think about them. He uses, instead, a time-and-effort-saving substitute for thinking, which he mistakes for thought: a disorganized set of conventional stereotypes. "Those who are loudest in protesting against medical help by the federal government are those who do not need help." "I never advocated taxing the rich to pay the poor. . . . The rate of taxation, to be fair, must be based upon ability to pay." "Americans have always had friendly feelings toward the Chinese." "I have always been disturbed by the tragedy of people who have been made victims of intolerance and fanaticism because of their race, color or religion." "I learned early . . . how important the farmers' prosperity is to the welfare of the country." "Equality of opportunity and equal justice under the law are not mere phrases." "[Our policy] was American because it aimed at the peaceful solution of a world trouble spot. It was American because it was based on the desire to see promises kept and human mis-

ery relieved." "It is basic to the way of life of democratic peoples that they respect the opinion of others." "There is enough in the world for everyone to have plenty to live on happily and to be at peace with his neighbors." And the favorite: "the special interests."

There is a kind of stereotype, most often of rural growth, that expresses an ancestral and real experience. Though short of clear and reasoned knowledge, these often carry a folk wisdom that can serve as a trustworthy guide. Some of these were part of Harry Truman's farm and small-town boyhood. They are the support, for example, of his genuine patriotism; and he did best as President when, leaning intuitively on them, he responded "like an American."

But as Mr. Truman pushed up from the family farm, he shifted to another kind of stereotype as a different sort of climber shifts to changed dress or furniture or accent. He decked himself out in gewgaws sold to him by fashionable Liberal shops: not natural products of ancestral experience but synthetic deductions from a barren, slipshod ideology. In his Presidential career and in his book it is this paste that he tries to pass off on us, and on himself, as authentic jewels.

The fate of a man without depth cannot be tragic, but it is both pathetic and grotesque that this man should have been President. Between the implicit imperative of the office and the existential reality of the man the disparity is so great that the mind balks: and this is one reason, I have come to think, that even responsible critics and historians are reconstructing their image of the man to fit him more nearly to the mold of the office. Most pathetic and most grotesque of all is Harry Truman's story of his decision to run in 1948. This man, mass-produced by the millions in a thousand towns and villages, found himself to be indispensable. He had to run in 1948 not "from a personal standpoint," but because he, only he, could complete the "unfinished business," meet

the challenge of Soviet Russia and sustain the heritage of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt in "the fight for liberalism and for a better life for the common man." "What I wanted to do personally for my own comfort and benefit was not important. What I could do to contribute to the welfare of the country was important. I had to enter the 1948 campaign for the presidency." Having thus entered, he carried to the people "in every one of my campaign speeches" the all-encompassing revelation: "there was just one issue . . . to vote on—the choice between special interests and the public welfare."

The man without depth is Ortega's mass-man: self-satisfied and self-righteous, accepting nothing as sacred or private, enjoying without comprehending the fruits of civilization, scornful of nobility and distinction, cocksure, thinking and feeling "like everyone," crowding into every precinct, terrified of loneliness.

But the mass-man, the man without depth, can never be at ease with one in whom he senses another dimension, an apartness from the mass. So, in his way, he must strike out against men who are "serious"—*hommes sérieux*. Just this is the recurring motif of the Truman *Memoirs*. All those, friend and enemy, ally and foe, who have resisted total immersion in the mass, those in whom *depth* can even in small measure be detected, must be "told off," "put in their place": Stalin, Churchill, de Gaulle, Chiang, James Forrestal (whose suicide is not even mentioned), Bernard Baruch ("his concern was really whether he would receive public recognition. . . . I had no intention of having him tell me what his job should be"), James F. Byrnes (to whom participation in a traditional culture gives *depth*), the moonstruck Henry Wallace, the supreme antagonist, Douglas MacArthur (who gets the longest and climactic section of the *Memoirs*), even Adlai Stevenson, who betrayed himself through the fact that his "attitude toward the President he hoped to succeed was a mystery to me." Of all the men of depth who moved into the Truman context, only Dean Acheson—a man both deep and sly—was able, by a delicately conceived flattery, to escape the curse of the mass-man.

We begin to find the answer to the question: Why did Harry Truman write his book? Of course he wrote it for money (you don't turn down a jackpot, do you?), but the money is not reason enough for this enterprise. Obviously the *Memoirs* are not history. As they read, there was not once in those seven-and-a-half years when the President was in error, not one action that he regrets, not one move that might have been better made, not one conflict in which his opponent was even possibly right. Not only is the record altered *ad lib*, but major episodes are simply eliminated. The names Hiss, Remington, Rosenberg, Fuchs, Lattimore, Caudle, Oliphant, for example, do not even appear. So this can hardly be history, or intended as such.

But perhaps the hypothesis of "the man without depth" is in the end untenable; perhaps it is only that the mass-man cannot bear to let his eye turn toward the deep well of himself. Somehow, in the end, in spite of the utter banality of all these 1200 pages, a cry, though from a far distance, breaks through. And the pitch of the cry is desperate. The man without depth wants, desperately—to prove that he exists. Therefore this book has been written, and therefore its author is not wholly without depth.

What else can be the meaning of the thousands of "I's"—no other book, no, not even by Rousseau, contains so many "I's." Surely (the author is pleading) such a multitudinous "I" must exist! And, if the proof is not complete, an "I" must unassailably exist if it has been President—been in named identity with the world's supreme office. Is it thinkable that the President—should not exist?

But even if a President could thinkably be unreal, not, surely, a President who daily and hourly decides. For this "I" decided, on its very own, the *Memoirs* time after time, and desperately, insist. *Year of Decisions*, the first volume is called; but by the witness of the text they were all years of decisions. And all the decisions were made by the "I": "in these differences of opinion . . . there was never any question as to who made the decisions and whose policy would be followed."

Or was there, really, just such a question? Is that just the point; and does the anxious, the overanxious and

so often repeated protestation make, by reverse implication, just that point? Is this mass-man, crying out in anguish from his metaphysical waste, really asking: Was it in truth I? And did I in truth decide? Or was it all illusion? Was it the sly Acheson, the undeviating Stalin, the intense Zionists, the polite British, the easy-talking Liberals, the pale experts of the State Department and the Treasury who were deciding? Or was it neither I nor they? Have all of us ceased deciding and thus existing? Was it only the inertia of the great bureaucratic machine, of the unleashed Leviathan that now plunges, blind and out of control, down the darkening ocean of time?

A Stole with Forget-me-nots

The Silent Church, by the Rev. Lino Gussoni and the Rev. Aristede Brunello. 391 pp. New York: Veritas Publishers. \$5.00

A couple of months ago, Monsignor Mykolas Krupavicius, President of the Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation, came to New York from his committee's headquarters in West Germany. He brought with him a priest's stole.

A stole worn by priests is invariably of one color, except for a cross embroidered near each end.

Monsignor Krupavicius said that this particular stole had been brought to him by a German who had just been released from the Soviet slave-labor camp, Vorkuta. The former prisoner had told him that it had been made by the women in the camp, in secret, in moments snatched from sleep after their labor in the mines and fields. The man could not explain where the women had obtained the thread, the material or the needles. But the stole's most striking peculiarity needed no explanation. Scattered over the whole front, on both sides, were hundreds of tiny, delicately embroidered forget-me-nots.

In Soviet Russia and in the nations held captive by the Communists, the Catholic Church is silent—but not dead. Despite an incredibly relentless campaign of persecutions, lies,

threats, deportations to slave-labor camps, torture, murder and destruction, it lives on, and men and women still cling to its faith. The Communists have yet to fool many of its believers into thinking that science is religion; dialectic materialism, Christianity; or the State, God.

The Silent Church does not pretend to be a "popular" exposé of the persecution of the Church. It merely documents the methodical destruction of the Catholic Church in Soviet Russia, the Baltic States, and the other seven captive nations. The countries are taken up one by one, each with its separate wealth of documents, some of which are reproduced in full, some paraphrased. Some are from Catholic sources; the rest are the handiwork of Communist officials or their dupes.

The pattern of persecution seems to have been pretty much the same everywhere, with minor variations according to the percentage of the population who had belonged to Churches of the Orthodox rites. In Poland, for instance, there was no historical justification for any prolonged attempt to woo the Church officials and/or congregations to the Moscow Church.

In almost every case, the countries "liberated" by the Communists were promised freedom of worship. In the early days in the authors' state, Poland, each "official ceremony began with a solemn Mass which was attended by all the members of the Government, headed by the Communist leader, Bierut."

And in the pact with the Baltic Republics dated October 10, 1939, the authors find the following:

The application of this treaty will in no wise be detrimental to the sovereign rights of the contracting parties and especially will it not be detrimental to their political institutions, their economic and social systems, their military organization, nor in general that which constitutes the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.

Gussoni and Brunello add:

A few days later, Molotov . . . declared: "We promise a scrupulous and loyal execution of the pacts signed by us on the basis of reciprocity, and we declare that the insensate 'cancans' about a Sovietization of the Baltic States are useless to our common enemies and to all the bands of anti-Soviet provocateurs!"

On June 25, only ten days after the Soviet occupation, the Communists nevertheless decreed the separation of Church and State. The next day they denounced the Concordat with the Holy See and obliged the Apostolic Nuncio, Monsignor Centoz, to leave Lithuania.

The next steps in the Communist plan for religious freedom were almost precisely what we should expect. Catholic demands for Communists' compliance with their promises were answered by perverted and lying accusations — ranging from charges of treason by high Catholic Church officials to blood-curdling stories of little girls raped by priests. Then came the arrests, torturings, the "trials," the deportations to slave-labor camps, followed by murders and more lies and treachery. Churches were turned into museums, Catholic presses were taken over by the state, and religious schools were turned over to Communist educators.

In *The Silent Church* the reader will not find the facts set forth in an easily readable manner and the footnotes and index that might have helped him find his way are missing. But any student or historian or clergyman, of whatever faith, any person with intelligence and compassion, will find in this book a record of the Communist war against religion which is the more valuable because the Communists themselves have provided so many of the documents. It is a record which should be on the obligatory reading list for those of Dr. Melish's parishioners who have defended him.

For those readers who are interested in a broader picture of Communist anti-religionism, Gary MacEoin wrote *The Communist War on Religion* (1951, Devin-Adair). Mr. MacEoin's book takes in the Far East as well as Russia, the Baltic States and the captive nations, including East Germany. He also expands his field to include the destruction of the Protestant, Jewish, Buddhist and Mohammedan (Islamic) religions, as well as Catholicism. Like most books which were written to inform readers of the truth about Communism, however, *The Communist War on Religion* is probably not easy to obtain.

MARCI A. L. KAHN

Two-way Hogwash

Some Inner Fury, by Kamala Markandaya. 255 pp. New York: The John Day Company. \$3.50

The best pages in Miss Markandaya's second novel describe the manners and mores of an upper-class Hindu family, and I found them refreshing and enlightening. The rest—as far as I am concerned—is either ingenuous misrepresentation of human nature (and, I must add, the Indian political situation) or disingenuous propaganda for the future envisioned by Karl Marx. Hogwash either way.

The story amounts to a mixture of East meets West and the boy-girl-tractor triangle. East, in this case, is the emancipated daughter of a substantial Indian family, and West is a young Englishman employed by the colonial government. They fall in love, but alas, their "inner furies"—to the extent that they indeed have some—make them more loyal to their respective classes than each other. As the plot around them thickens (the blurb tactfully speaks of the quote conflict . . . between British rule and the Indian will to freedom unquote) their personal I-to-I feelings get thinner and thinner.

In the end there is a big scene in which the heroine's revolutionary half-brother is tried before a British court for a terrorist killing (the blurb has "terrorist" in quotation marks, too, presumably to help the killer's end to justify his means).

A great mob of Indians rescues him, as its fury righteously recedes, the

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heroine hesitates, then she says:

I knew I would follow these people, even as I knew Richard would stay . . . my heart wept, tearless, desolate, silently to itself. But . . . what matter to the world if here and there a man should fall, or a head or a heart should break?

It was perhaps ingenuous of me to have implied above that any novel which in A.D. 1956 can end on these staunchly, cornily Communist sentiments might be anything except Communist propaganda. The point is, here it makes no difference. Innocent or conscious, Miss Markandaya is all wet about what is permanently decent or heroic in a human being. Even if her story were set among a people as uncontroversial as the Eskimos, I could not respect her heroine. A girl who leaves her man because their parents, or countries, or races, or any other outside factors are at odds will never, I'm afraid, move me to anything more than mild contempt. I prefer Juliet, Cleopatra, Isolde, Anna Karenina. I like individual loyalties. I agree with E. M. Forster, a man who loved India and wrote a beautiful, reverent book about its people, but who also once said that if he ever had to choose between his best friend and his country, he hoped he'd have the human guts to choose the former.

ROBERT PHELPS

through the period following the disaster; and what Reynaud terms, with a touch of Romantic fervor, "My Prisons." It is about as well put together as an *omnium gatherum* is likely to be, the translation is skillful, and there is an excellent index.

The book's most valuable pages are those that deal with the prewar mentality of France, and the disappearance of both feeling for reality and ordinary common sense. The terrible French appetite for rhetoric covered everything as with the muddy pulp of a dissolved eighteenth-century dictionary, completely obscuring the basic fact that the half-dead France of 1918 had neither reserves nor adequate arms. Even General Weygand could see this: "If we are forced into winning another victory, we shall win it!" Then, to put it bluntly, everybody began to run, the poor French not offering one single battle, and the British scrambling like schoolboys for the ports. In the dispatches, Churchillian rhetoric joins with the French flood, but it is of no avail in the general *sauve-qui-peut* and the ugly intrigues devoted to "passing the buck."

Looked at as a narrative, the book is too formidable a mass of documents, quotes, state memoranda and notebook opinions for any one mind to deal with. As a compendium, however, it should be of no small value to coming historians. Above all, perhaps it will serve to point up the famous remark of Chancellor Oxenstierna, "Go, my son, and see with what little common sense the world is governed."

HENRY BESTON

Formidable Compendium

In the Thick of the Fight, 1930-1945, by Paul Reynaud. Translated by James D. Lambert. 684 pp. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc. \$7.50

At first glance this encyclopaedic volume seems to be only another French politician's apologia for his role in the overwhelming disaster of June 1940. Actually, however, it is a series of historical papers and serious personal memoranda in which the patient scholar can find food for a good deal of thought.

The book deals with four major topics: political maneuverings within the third French republic during the late 1920s and the 1930s; the French declaration of war upon Germany and the ensuing military disaster; the political free-for-all

Frank and Unofficial

Journey into a Fog, by Margareta Berger-Hamerschlag. 254 pp. New York: Sheed & Ward. \$3.50

The "fog" into which Mrs. Berger-Hamerschlag is journeying is the morally peassoup milieu of lower middle class London teenagers—the spivs, the delinquents, the boys and girls whose lives seem to be without choice, ardor, passion, youth, or consistent impulse of any sort except a joyless acknowledgment of sex.

They spend their days as factory hands or tradesmen's apprentices; and their evenings and nights on street-corners, apathetic, bored, without de-

light. All the possibilities they seem aware of are equally unattractive. They keep their emotional expenditures to a deadpan minimum, and relieve their nervous tension by sporadic acts of minor violence, petty larceny, internecine brutality.

The wife of an architect, herself a portrait painter, Mrs. B's is a volunteer teacher who offers classes in painting at Youth Clubs organized to tempt them off the streets. This record of her experience is frank, unofficial, inconclusive. She is neither a professional sociologist with a theory nor a self-righteous do-gooder with a judgment. She has simply watched these youngsters, worked with them for—among other reasons—her own need to do so, and put down what she saw.

There is no prettying. She describes loneliness, bafflement, inarticulate hate and hurt. And she is thoughtful enough, in the face of all this, not to dream wishfully of neutering even the least tractable of these misfits into "an unproblematic, well-behaved standard man." "I'd rather make people hug their complexes as their most valuable possessions," she sagely adds.

Finishing her book, I wondered to whom it might appeal. I should like, for everyone's sake, to warn off the people who will just find it another crackerjack chance to be loudly shocked, and to denounce a decadent society that has not upheld standards, etc. Nor would I like to see it give any satisfaction to students of psychology, sociology, or the decline of the West.

What I really hope is that here and there a few readers will see that the best thing in *Journey into a Fog* is Mrs. B's own example. I think that no large-scale action—neither opinions from pulpits nor legislation from Parliament nor diagnoses by pathologists—will solve the problems of Mrs. B's youngsters. They need help, all right, but they need it from individual, flesh-and-blood, unpatronizing men and women, exactly as concrete and inconclusive as Mrs. B herself. And even so, not all of them will be—can be—reached. But for every person who brings them a little love, and candor, and a need of his own, there will be one of them, and then another, and then another, who will respond.

ROGER BECKET

To the Editor

"Backbone" for Conservatives

I sincerely hope that wasn't discouragement I heard in "The Skin of Our Teeth" [editorial, February 22]. I think you're doing a superb job.

After reading the first fourteen issues, I can feel my conservatism at long last acquiring some BACKBONE—especially after the shame I felt after reading "A Bow to the Left" [editorial, January 18].

Fair Haven, N.J. EDWARD J. JENNINGS

On Desegregation

Your stand on the issue of the Supreme Court's desegregation decision is atrocious. Please don't let conservatism blind your sense for distinguishing between evil and good. Discrimination is evil and should be abolished whether or not it is an old Southern custom. The mere inverteness of a custom does not constitute a logical reason for its continuance....

Now for the compliments. Each time I read your journal I am... impressed with your forthrightness in expressing ideals which I have had and which I was beginning to think were obsolete and unintellectual. Now I realize that a Ph.D. does not guarantee that a man's opinions are right or even logical. NATIONAL REVIEW has helped me become aware of the collectivistic tendencies of my own history teacher. My alertness has spread to my classmates....

GLORIA WUERDEMANN
Cliffside Park, N.J.

Your remarks on "The Assault on Miss Lucy" in the February 22 issue are highly commendable.

If the people of other parts of our country would inform themselves on the history of the enactment of the 14th Amendment,... the basis of the new interpretation... by the Supreme Court, they could understand better the position of the South in regard to this purely political ruling.

At the close of the Civil War, the South willingly ratified the 13th Amendment as the price to be paid for defeat.... [But when] the Radi-

cals in the North proposed the 14th Amendment, and the Southern states refused to ratify it, then Thad Stevens and his crowd put through Congress measures for the "Reconstruction" of the South, which provided for an army of occupation. Thus ratification was accomplished at bayonet point....

The political, social and economic phases [of the Reconstruction] have continued to this day, the Court's recent decision on segregation being the last link.

Gatlinburg, Tenn. JAMES A. PEOPLES

Deluded Psychoanalysts

I must confess to a sense of morbid fascination as I read Frank Meyer's excellent, though disturbing article, "Symptoms of Mass Delusion" [February 8]. It was something of a shock to learn that so-called scientists of the mind.... are themselves so deluded that they can seriously believe that all who love freedom and abhor the very concept of the totalitarian socialist "welfare state" owe their convictions to a sort of "psychoanalytical original sin" which they have labeled the "Authoritarian Personality."....

SARTELL PRENTICE, JR.
West Hempstead, N.Y.

Diversified Family Approves

NATIONAL REVIEW's general appeal rather surprised me. My family is made up of: a warehouse worker, a bank teller, an educator (for over thirty years), a truck driver, a social worker, a telephone company employee, an electrical engineer, a marine, a junior executive and two high school basketball players. Every single one of them read it with absorption.

My conclusion upon watching them is that my family along with millions of others is starved for the truth.

Westbury, N.Y. KATHERINE FITZGERALD

"Beacon of Hope"

You... did a masterful job of getting NATIONAL REVIEW air-borne, and we of "the rotten patriotic fringe," as Robert Skaife called us, see in it a beacon of hope;

Hemet, Cal. FRANCES BECK

Coverage of Hughes Trial

Your superb coverage of the Hughes trial was most welcome indeed, particularly in view of the eloquent editorial silence in our "liberal" press. I have always claimed that the noisy concern of our liberals over the alleged "unethical" methods of Senator McCarthy is nothing but a hypocritical device to conceal their evil machinations. Their present attitude proves my contention to the point of evidence.

Bronx, N.Y.

REV. J. B. CAROL, O.F.M.

... permit me to congratulate you on the excellent pieces concerning the Hughes case. As NATIONAL REVIEW so ably and rightly pointed out, the editorial silence in the major part of the Big Press about the outrageous behavior of Messrs. Rauh, Fritchie and Friendly is a kind of assent-by-silence.

New York City

ALICE WIDENER

Mr. Schlamm on Mencken

H. L. Mencken is dead, but "Homo Boobiens" lives on, and unfortunately will continue as long as men people the earth.

Mencken, who was a master of concise English prose, would be disgusted by the clumsy, muddled style of the article about him [February 15]. Its substance would be highly amusing to him, as were all such diatribes during his lifetime....

Stamford, Conn. FREDERICK MCFARLAND

How reassuring it was for us to read "To Mencken—In His Spirit!" The fresh precision of Mr. Schlamm's style has proved that the language for which H. L. Mencken did so much, has produced another craftsman worthy of its beauty....

Butte, Montana


EDNA CORLESS

Criticizes Critic

... Mr. Walter Woodford [letter, February 29] thought the editorial "On Talking to Ourselves" childish. We don't know why, and perhaps Mr. Woodford doesn't either.... He accuses NATIONAL REVIEW of having "rejected the support of the strongest, soundest and most dedicated Conservatives...." And who may these be? Perhaps the "new conservatives" of the Peter Viereck stripe, or the "liberal-conservatives" who now rule the Washington roost?

Bayside, N.Y.

GERTRUDE J. BUCK



Peaceful coexistence... **bunk!**

"It is inconceivable," said Lenin, "that communism and democracy can exist side by side in this world. Inevitably one must perish."

Too many people forget — because they want to forget — this basic rule of communism. *The communists do not forget.* The writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin are still communist law. There is no compromise . . . no middle ground . . . no enduring "coexistence."

How long communism can live, no one knows. Freedom will never die. Its leaders will long outlive communism's "unholy three." Tyranny always causes its own destruction.


W.B. Stewart
PRESIDENT



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